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This thesis addresses the problem of teaching and learning vocabulary in
English as a Second Language (ESL), and proposes that a vocabulary based on the
process of metaphoric extension could be taught directly. Despite the fact that an
inadequate vocabulary is one of the main obstacles for intermediate-level ESL
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students, both ESL teachers and applied linguists have emphasized other aspects of
English more than the study of vocabulary teaching and learning. Consequently, ESL
students have few strategies for learning vocabulary other than reliance on the
dictionary, and the predominant strategy for teachers is to present words rather
unsystematically in the reading curriculum. In an effort to overcome this inadequacy,
current vocabulary research is identifying central patterns of word usage, including
lexical phrases and other 'chunks', core words, and semantic fields. One central
pattern of usage that has not yet been researched is metaphoric extension. Since the
so-called 'dead' metaphors produced by that process are lexical items expressing
either literal or conventional meaning, they are also candidates for direct teaching.
In teaching such a vocabulary, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of
what a metaphor is, and the standard definitions do not supply sufficient explanations.
Therefore, some of the dominant theories about metaphor are examined in order to
extrapolate more precise concepts. This analysis leads to the conclusion that it is the
multi-faceted duality of sense in a metaphor that distinguishes it from any other kind
of expression, which cannot be fully appreciated unless both the pragmatic and the
semantic aspects of metaphor are taken into account. Essentially, metaphor is the use
of an expression to refer to something in a distinctly different conceptual,
phenomenal, or experiential domain in order to imply that two things may be seen as
if they were similar when in fact they are substantially different. The speaker and
hearer tacitly agree to see this similarity, all the while holding in mind the fact that
there is no actual similarity. Consequently, the expression used metaphorically is
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given not only two referents, but also a duality of sense: its literal and conventional
sense and the sense communicated by the metaphorical comparison; in Kittay's (1987)
terms, a 'first-order' and a 'second-order' meaning.
It is proposed that a novel metaphor becomes established in the lexicon as a

dead metaphor because we disregard the first-order meaning for pragmatic reasons;
essentially, to exploit the communicative efficacy of the second-order meaning. Some
metaphors are genuinely 'dead' because they express a literal and conventional sense.
This is a new first-order meaning, or a new sense, established by metaphoric
extension; therefore, we necessarily disregard the original first-order meaning. Others
could be regarded as 'stock' metaphors because it is possible to use them to express
metaphorical meaning even though they are normally used to express conventional or
even literal meaning; i.e., there are degrees to which we disregard the first-order
meaning, depending on communicative goals. Therefore, metaphoric extension is a
systematic process that sometimes establishes new senses, which can be represented
by diagrams. However, it is important to avoid erroneously attributing semantic
change to metaphoric extension; therefore, other processes of semantic change are
also examined, particularly literal generalization.
Since the development, selection, and organization of a vocabulary based on
metaphoric extension involves projects that lie beyond the scope of this paper, the
thesis concludes with some brief guidelines for the ESL teacher. If the ideas herein
are found to have merit, they should serve as a basis for developing both teaching
strategies and learning strategies.
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM OF VOCABULARY TEACHING IN ESL

"I was parlous blithe to receive your letter." The Chinese-Cambodian
immigrant who wrote this sentence asked me why no one had understood what it
meant and then showed me where parlous and blithe were listed in his ChineseEnglish dictionary. I improvised a lesson on appropriateness of expression, knowing
the real problem ran deeper than that. This young man was among the handful of
intermediate-level students of English as a Second Language (ESL) who had told me
that their main problem was vocabulary, and that they were frustrated about not
knowing how to learn more words. During the three terms that I taught them, I
believed I had taken advantage of every opportunity to teach them new words and
expressions, always striving to tie in related terms, derived forms, fixed phrases, and
idioms. However, I knew the underlying problem was that vocabulary is taught only
incidentally to other ESL topics. ESL teachers lack sufficient strategies for teaching
vocabulary, and consequently ESL students have few strategies for learning
vocabulary other than reliance on the dictionary.
A growing number of linguists and teachers are arguing that neither ESL
teaching nor ESL research has given enough attention to vocabulary even though
hardly anyone would deny that it is the most salient aspect of language. Linguistic
theory that concentrates on syntax is often blamed for this benign neglect, but
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teaching and learning vocabulary is a complex problem compounded by the limitations
of the classroom and the range of student needs. The basic questions have always
been what words to teach and how to organize these words, but the more recent goal
of helping students achieve communicative competence has influenced the recognition
of another dimension: patterns of word usage. A current trend in vocabulary
research is to describe central patterns of word usage, and the emerging methods of
organizing vocabulary according to these patterns should be useful in devising
strategies for both teaching and learning.
This paper proposes that one of the central patterns of word usage is
metaphoric extension, which in its most prolific effect yields the open class of socalled 'dead' metaphors. This paper further proposes that we should directly teach
not only the various senses of 'dead' metaphors, but also the process of metaphoric
extension itself. As a strategy for teaching, it allows many related senses and words
to be taught simultaneously. In turn, once the ESL students understand the process,
they may be able to use it as a strategy for independent vocabulary learning.

IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM

The Importance of Vocabulary
The importance of vocabulary in language acquisition cannot be denied. As
Laufer (1986) points out, "No language acquisition, whether first, second, or foreign;
child or adult, can take place without the acquisition of lexis" (p. 69). Many ESL
learners who have passed through the initial stages of acquisition report that
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vocabulary learning is their greatest single problem (Crow and Quigley 1985; Meara
1980), and a few studies suggest that intermediate and advanced students may commit
more lexical errors than syntactical errors (Laufer 1986; McKay 1980). Wallace
(1982) describes how lexical errors typically involve the inability to retrieve
vocabulary that has been taught or learned, not learning the kind of vocabulary
needed for the student's purposes, and using words and expressions inappropriately.
The impairment of vocabulary knowledge and skills becomes critical in the
more advanced stages of acquisition, for it is here that the student not only confronts
text that is no longer simplified, but also needs to learn the standards of written
English. By then the student is expected to be able to speak and write relatively
fluently, and to perform more like a "good reader [who] has a sufficient command
over the language so that words are recognized automatically--sight vocabulary--or
recognized in context" (Nation and Coady 1988, p. 102). Teaching students how to
predict and verify word meaning in context is a currently favored method of teaching
reading and (incidentally) vocabulary, but with an inadequate vocabulary, "they
cannot interpret surrounding context" (Nation and Coady 1988, p. 107).

For the

ESL student, then, an inadequate vocabulary is "one of the main obstacles to
progress" (Nation 1982, p 20).

The Benign Neglect of Vocabulary
Despite the importance of vocabulary for the student, both ESL teachers and
applied linguists have emphasized other aspects of English more than the study of
vocabulary teaching and learning (Carter and McCarthy 1988; Richards 1976). 1
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Laufer (1986) points to hundreds of studies as well as theoretical and methodological
papers, including some that promote communicative competence, which say almost
nothing about vocabulary development, "as if vocabulary was not part of second
language acquisition" (p. 69). In the classroom and in textbooks as well, primacy has
been given to grammar (Sinclair and Renouf 1988; Summers 1988). The
conventional approach is to limit vocabulary "to what is pedagogically necessary"
(Wilkins 1976, p. 7), and vocabulary is often used "as a vehicle for the illustration of
grammatical topics rather than a set of counters with a communicative value in
themselves" (Twaddell 1980, p. 440). Typically, it is expected that vocabulary
expansion will be fulfilled by the reading program, yet even here most vocabulary is
taught indirectly (Richards 1976). In general, despite the recent shift away from the
formal aspects of language and toward the interactively communicative use of
language in naturalistic contexts, "relatively little attention has been given to
vocabulary use in particular, as compared to language use in general" (Cowie 1988,

p. 126).
This secondary role for vocabulary is partly attributable to foreign language
teaching methods influenced by "trends in linguistic theory" (Richards 1976, p. 77).
The trends in both theory and methodology in this century can be traced to Saussure's
introduction, in the late nineteenth century, of the concepts langue and parole.

Langue represents the abstract system of structural relationships
inherent in language ... Parole, on the other hand, represents the
individual act of speaking, which is never performed exactly the same
way twice. (Newmeyer 1986, p. 3)
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This distinction provided a rationale for replacing the grammar-translation (or
classical) method, which emphasized langue by analyzing grammar, learning and
practicing grammatical rules, translating classical texts into the native language, and
memorizing lists of isolated, mostly literary words. With parole as the main goal of
foreign language teaching, the new 'direct' method taught vocabulary as part of a
controlled progression in developing oral communication skills.

However, although

the direct method has survived in some private schools (e.g., the Berlitz method) and
was revived in the '40s and '50s as the audiolingual method, it was difficult to
implement in the public classroom, and most foreign language curricula returned to
the grammar-translation method by the 1920s. In the meantime, at least in the U.S.,
theoretical linguistics became dominated by followers of Bloomfield who concentrated
on the empirical description of language, and the resulting 'structural linguistics'
treated words primarily as components of structure rather than as communicative
units. (For more complete discussions, see Brown 1987; Carter and McCarthy 1988;
Newmeyer 1986; and Richards 1974.)
In reaction to both structural linguistics and the grammar-translation method,
the 'vocabulary control movement' of the 1930s attempted to achieve communicative
adequacy in students of English as a foreign language by teaching "a basic minimum
vocabulary for the learning of English" (Carter and McCarthy 1988, p. 2).

Initiated

by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards, the aim of the movement was to simplify the
teaching of English by using a 'basic English word list' of 850 words and reducing
the rules of usage. In the 1950s, this list was expanded to 2,000 words with the
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publication of Michael West's General Service List, and became useful in the
audiolingual method. (See also Ogden 1934; Read 1988; I. A. Richards 1943; J.
Richards 1974.)

Based on the theories of structural linguistics and behaviorist psychology, and
still influential today, the audiolingual method postpones vocabulary expansion until
the student has achieved mastery of the structure (Brown 1987; McKay 1980).
Originally known as the Army Specialized Training Program or the 'Army method',
audiolingualism grew out of the need, during and immediately after World War II, to
teach basic fluency in a foreign language quickly, which obviated the grammartranslation method with its emphasis on reading and its predominantly literary
vocabulary. Because the students were expected to expand their vocabulary at some
later stage, usually while living in the foreign country, structure was more important
than vocabulary. Consequently, for both teaching foreign languages to English
speakers and teaching English as a foreign language, "the period 1945-1970 was a
limbo for vocabulary as an aspect of language teaching in its own right" (Carter and
McCarthy 1988, p. 41).
However, the secondary role of vocabulary in ESL teaching has extended
beyond 1970, partly as a result of attempts to translate Chomky's generative model of
language into teaching methodology. Two of Chomsky's ideas have had a broad
appeal for teaching methodology. The first is that language is infinite and recursive:
we are capable of producing an infinite set of possible sentences, and in any given
sentence, an infinite number of embedded sentences is possible. Second, language is

7

creative and independent: we can understand and produce novel utterances
independently of any specific stimulus. According to the generative model, language
has these formal properties because it is a rule-governed, structure-dependent system.
These concepts suggest that the child's acquisition of language is not a product of
stimulus-response mechanisms, but rather it is a process of forming hypotheses about
the system and then testing, revising, or abandoning these hypotheses.

Some

teaching methodologists have reasoned that if second-language acquisition in any way
recapitulates first-language acquisition, then we ought to focus on the rule-governed,
structure-dependent system. Consequently, for a while generative linguistics "only
served to reinforce the idea that lexis was somewhat peripheral" (Carter and
McCarthy 1988, p. 41).
Rivers (1972) expresses this idea as follows:
In our foreign-language classrooms we have gone beyond isolated
words, mere "vocabulary teaching": We have realized that what
students must possess is the ability to use syntactic structures into
which they can incorporate these words to communicate their
intentions. They can acquire the many new labels they will need as
their interests develop. In class we ensure that they are familiar with a
basic vocabulary that can be used for many purposes. This they can
use to practice the syntactic operations they will need, if the rich
vocabulary they will acquire later is to express their meaning
appropriately. (p. 57, italics added)
Although Chomsky's principles and the principles of audiolingualism are very
different from each other, the effect of this attitude on vocabulary teaching and
learning is somewhat the same. The emphasis is still on the manipulation of
structure, and vocabulary is a 'mere' sub-topic that students somehow are expected to
learn later with little guidance or direct teaching. At best, vocabulary is used as a
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means of illustrating notions, functions, how meaning is negotiated through
interaction, how communication occurs in context, etc. (See Savignon 1983.)
One reason for the continued benign neglect of vocabulary may be that
grammar and phonology "are closed systems and therefore lend themselves to much
more abstraction and generalization than vocabulary, which is ... an open set" (Laufer
1986, p. 70). In addition, within the teaching profession there has been more interest
in methodology than in content, and vocabulary lists are "reminiscent of teaching
methods that are not currently in fashion" (Sinclair and Renouf 1988, p. 145).

The Complexity of the Problem
Reasons other than the influence of linguistic theory or teaching methodology
have also contributed to the secondary status of vocabulary in ESL teaching.
Broadening an explanation given by Twaddell (1980), both qualitative and quantitative
factors are involved. The qualitative aspects of vocabulary teaching involve the
complexity of word forms and meanings; the quantitative aspects are related to the
limitations of the classroom.
Twaddell (1980) gives an interesting analysis of how attitude has affected the
role of vocabulary in the ESL classroom. In the first place, among teachers there is
the "general conviction that our students learn vocabulary control slowly and
erratically" (p. 440) because there are inherent difficulties in learning a foreign
vocabulary. Second, students often "exaggerate the importance of learning at once
'what the words mean'" (p. 440) and assume that there are exact correspondences of
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meaning between a native word and a foreign word. In reaction, teachers tend to
"down-grade" vocabulary (p. 440).
The other main limitation in the classroom is time. The students need to learn
a large amount of language in a small amount of time. Within these time constraints,
it is impossible to teach students all the words they will need to know (Nation 1982;
Twaddell 1980).
When considering the qualitative aspects of vocabulary teaching, it is
important to keep in mind the basic question of what it means to know a word. In
attempting to answer this question, Richards (1976) proposes eight assumptions. The
first one is that native speakers continue to expand their vocabulary in adulthood; the
implication is that ESL students should do so as well. The other seven say that
knowing a word is ...
... knowing whether a word is used frequently;
... knowing how to use it appropriately in discourse;
... knowing its syntactic behavior;
... knowing its "underlying form" as well as its derivations;
... knowing the "network of associations between that word and other words";
... knowing its "minimal semantic features";
••. knowing a word's internal "associated" meanings (pp. 78-83).
Richards concludes, "The goals of vocabulary teaching must be more than simply
covering a certain number of words on a word list" (p. 88).
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Setting goals for vocabulary teaching entails questions about what words are
most needed by the students, whether to distinguish between spoken and written
language, the quantity of words, the sequence of teaching, and whether any particular
method of organizing vocabulary will facilitate learning. (For broad discussions, see
Carter and McCarthy 1988; Richards 1974; and Sinclair and Renouf 1988.)
Furthermore, among the words most needed by the students in both spoken and
written contexts are those that native speakers use and understand as multi-word
'chunks' of meaning; e.g., idioms, formulaic speech patterns, and other relatively
'fixed' expressions. It is suggested by Cowie (1981; 1988), Nattinger (1988), and
Yorio (1980), that these 'chunks' be treated as lexical units in ESL teaching.
The primary reason to organize the vocabulary in any particular way is to
account for those aspects of word meaning that contribute to 'knowing' a word in the
way Richards proposes: (a) the relatedness of meaning between and among words
(synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, metonymy, etc.); (b) relatedness of meaning
within words; i.e., polysemy and the 'fuzzy' boundaries of word meaning; and (c)
pragmatic aspects of vocabulary, such as how meaning is negotiated, how new senses
are created, and patterns of both conversational and written discourse (Carter and
McCarthy 1988; Cowie 1988; McCarthy 1988). Of course, the native speaker
acquires this word knowledge by using and hearing words used in many different
contexts. For the ESL student, the learning process may be accelerated by a
vocabulary organization that takes these aspects of meaning into account.
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The most useful vocabulary organization would be one that helped the students
remember the words and use them appropriately. If we organize words in the mind
in certain ways, and use that organization to retrieve words for speaking and writing,
then it would make sense to present words to ESL students in the same organization.
Unfortunately, the answer is not that simple, for research on verbal learning and
memory has not yet been able to describe our so-called 'mental lexicon' .2
The preceding discussion of the quantitative and qualitative issues involved in
vocabulary teaching and learning is by no means complete, but it may serve
Twaddell's injunction "to be clear about the complex nature of the problem itself"
(Twaddell 1980, p. 443). Unfortunately, it may be this complexity that discourages
the direct teaching of vocabulary. At the same time, there is a growing belief that
"language practitioners need not shy away from lexis as a boundless chaos;
organizational principles are available and simply wait to be more fully exploited"
(Carter and McCarthy 1988, p. 38).

SOME RECENT WORK IN VOCABULARY STUDY

In the past fifteen years there has been an upsurge of interest in the study of
vocabulary teaching and learning, stimulated primarily by the goals of communicative
competence. The communicative approach has shifted value from sounds and
structures to meaning and discourse. ESL methodology is now guided by a more
holistic view of language, a recognition that both language acquisition and language
use are more process than product, and a willingness to accept fluency at the expense
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of accuracy from the students. There is also more interest in learner-centered
teaching, the problems of the more advanced learner, and teaching for selfmanagement. Attending these new interests is an awareness that an inadequate
vocabulary may be more of an impediment to communication than syntactic
inaccuracy. (For more complete discussions, see Carter and McCarthy 1988; Laufer
1986; McCarthy 1988; Savignon 1983; Sinclair and Renouf 1988; Strevens 1982;
Wallace 1982; Widdowson 1979.)

Central Patterns of Usage
The trend in current research is to identify the "central patterns of usage [of
words]" (Sinclair and Renouf 1988, p. 148) and "to explore the nature of their
relationship as connected items in a coherent text" (Carter 1988, p. 171).
Consequently, some vocabulary is selected and organized according to the
communicative purposes that it serves.
Courses in English for Specific Purposes (ESP) teach vocabulary as well as
grammar and rhetoric for education (both academic disciplines and the teaching
profession), sciences, and occupations (Martin 1976; Strevens 1982; Widdowson
1979). The courses are designed around the educational and occupational goals of the
students, and the teaching process is more of a training than an education in that the
objective is to develop a restricted competence in the practical use of English
(Widdowson 1983). Strevens (1982) claims that ESP has shown excellent results and
stands out as a desirable alternative to "the disappointing achievements of long-term,
low-intensity, general English courses" (p. 469).
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However, Widdowson (1983) claims that the concept of ESP has often been
misinterpreted as a method of teaching only the specialized words that are used in
specific disciplines. He says that this vocabulary is "symbolically highly specific
and .. .indexical in use to a narrow range of reference" (p. 92). Students also need to
acquire a mediating "procedural vocabulary" consisting of words
subject to a wide range of interpretation ... words of wide indexical
range [that] are especially useful for negotiating conveyance of more
specific concepts, for defining terms which relate to particular frames
of reference. (pp. 92-93)
Procedural vocabulary defines, interprets, paraphrases, expresses register, achieves
cohesion and coherence, and creates novel expressions such as metaphor. It also
fulfills the four maxims of Grice's (1975) 'cooperative principle' for conversation,
which may be paraphrased as follows:
1) Make your contribution as informative as required, but not more
than required.
2) Be truthful, neither saying what you know to be false, nor saying
something for which you lack evidence.
3) Be relevant.
4) Be brief and orderly; avoid ambiguity and obscurity of expression.
In effect, like the word lists of the 'vocabulary control movement', Widdowson' s
concept of procedural vocabulary is an attempt at identifying and defining a
"'common-core' vocabulary" (p. 92). However, whereas the earlier word lists were
based on high frequency counts, Widdowson is focusing on the communicative
functions that words perform in discourse.

3

Carter (1987a; 1987b; 1988) is also trying to identify a 'core' vocabulary and
proposes some tentative tests for core words. According to Carter (1987a), a
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fundamental feature of core words is that they are "more tightly integrated into the
language system" (p. 179). Therefore, a general test for a core word is whether it
can be substituted for many other words with similar meaning, whether it has more
'collocations' (i.e., habitual associations) with other words, and whether it is used in
more compounds, idioms, phrasal verbs, etc. It will be easier to find an antonym for
a core word, and a core word will have more generic than specific properties. A
·second general test for core words is whether they "are more discoursely neutral than
others; that is, they function in pragmatic contexts of language use as generally
unmarked and non-expressive" (p. 180). Therefore, a core word is free from culturespecific uses and will not be associated with any particular field of discourse (e.g.,
nautical speech); it will be neither too formal nor too informal, and will be neutral
with respect to judgmental associations (strong/weak, good/bad, positive/negative,
etc.). Also, according to this test, core words are used more often in discourse that
summarizes experience.
Another central pattern of word usage may be identified as the open set of
language 'chunks'--the prefabricated expressions that we learn, use, and understand as
communicative units. Such an expression is 'prefabricated' because we do not create
it by combining its component words; it has been pre-packaged by our speech
community. The most fixed or frozen form is commonly identified as the idiom:
kick the bucket; open up a can of worms; cut to the chase.

While some 'prefabs' are

restricted to spoken English (you betcha; like I say; now mind you; there you go; what
it is is; say what?), others are commonly used in writing, including formal registers;
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e.g., as a matter offact; on the one/the other hand; by and large; no sooner than; in
the long/short run; by virtue of; on the face of it.

Less obvious are the numerous

collocations that we utter with no consciousness of choosing to associate the words:
flow of traffic; bitter truth,· stunning victory; crushing defeat; sweeping
generalizations; last-ditch effort,· den of iniquity; run amuck,· big mistake vs. large

mistake. It might even be argued that the phrase BE going to as a marker of future
tense is one of these chunks. Bolinger and Spears (1981) suggest that we store these
chunks of language in memory in the same way we store individual words.
Using the general term 'lexical phrase' to characterize some chunks of
language, Nattinger (1986) focuses on how they function in conversation. Lexical
phrases may be described as "conventionalized structures that occur more frequently
and have more idiomatically determined meaning than language that is put together
each time" (p. 3).

Nattinger (1988) points out that natural language processing is

"basically a 'compositional' process, one of 'stitching together' preassembled phrases
[i.e., not just single words] into discourse" (p. 76). These phrases are relatively
fixed, but can be expanded; e.g.:
this/that point
at this/that point in time/history/the story
prior to/before/after/since that point
the point is
the main/most important/central point is
to the point
more to the point
short and to the point
to come/raise/make/develop a point
to drive a point home

16

Stitching several together could yield this kind of sentence: On the other hand, the

fact of the matter is that

at

about this point in time Hitler was going nuts.

Nattinger (1988) advocates teaching lexical phrases and their patterns of usage
in terms of their functions as social interactions, necessary topics, and discourse

devices. 'Social interactions' include greetings/closings, politeness routines,
question/answer formulas, requesting, etc. 'Necessary topics' include language,
weather, shopping, autobiography, etc. 'Discourse devices' include:
fluency devices: You know ...
Let me think ...
Well, it seems to me ...
conjunctions: Which is to say that ...
subordinators: In other words .. .
logical connectors: As a result.. .
temporal connectors: In that day and age ...
In an empirical study of academic lectures, DeCarrico and Nattinger (1988)
describe a taxonomy of discourse devices that function as either global or local
'macro-organizers'. Global macro-organizers include topic markers (The first thing

is... ), topic shifters (So let's tum to ... ), and summarizers (What I'm saying is that... ).
Local macro-organizers include exemplifiers (Take something like ... ), relators (This

ties in with ... ), evaluators (Look what's going on here ... ), qualifiers (The catch here
is... ), and aside markers (I guess I got off the track here ... ). One rationale for
teaching the patterns of lexical phrase usage is that a native language is acquired in
chunks, only some of which are technically words. 4 (See Peters 1983.) Therefore,
ESL students "already have developed this strategy in the language they bring to the
classroom" (Nattinger 1980, p. 341).
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Semantic Fields
An approach to organizing vocabulary that would be less concerned with either
sociolinguistic or acquisition issues, and more concerned with semantic relatedness
between words, is suggested by semantic field theory. The notion of semantic fields
is based on two assumptions. First, "the vocabulary of a language is structured, just
as the grammar and phonology are structured" (Lehrer 1974 p. 15). Second, word
meaning is partly determined by "relations of sense holding within sets of lexemes"
(Lyons 1977, p. 270), which can be characterized generally as systems of affinity and
contrast (Kittay 1987). Therefore, it is possible to identify sets of "lexemes that share
some aspect of meaning" (Lehrer 1983, p. 18).
The broadest aspect of meaning is a "conceptual field" (Lyons 1977, p. 253);
e.g., perception (colors, shapes), activities (cooking, fishing, hunting, agriculture,
building), culture (marriage, kinship, values, beliefs), animals, plants, health, war,
etc. The lexical sets in each conceptual field are structured according to relations of
affinity (synonymy and hyponymy) or contrast (antonymy and incompatibility).
"Incompatibility is the most basic contrast to be found ... for example, 'blue', 'green',
'yellow', 'red', etc." (Kittay 1987, p. 241); i.e., something cannot be both blue and
green and still be either blue or green. Lyons (1977) divides antonyms into "gradable
and ungradable opposites" (p. 271). Ungradable opposites are complementary (deadalive, married-single, male-female); "the denial of one member of the pair implies the
assertion of the other" (Lehrer 1974, p. 26). Gradable opposites can be compared by
their positions on a scale (hot-warm-tepid-cool-cold-icy). If something is hot, it is not
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any other degree on the scale, but to deny that something is hot does not assert it is
warm, tepid, cool, cold, or, icy. Lehrer (1974) identifies two other contrasts as well:
converseness (buy-sell) and rank.
There are many ways of organizing vocabulary into semantic fields because
the theory lacks adequate criteria for defining fields and determining whether a lexical
item belongs to a particular field (Lehrer 1983; Lyons 1977).

5

Consequently,

McKay (1980) assumes that semantic fields can be identified as those listed in a
thesaurus as synonyms, and then recommends teaching the groups of synonyms by
exposing students to examples in written contexts taken from the Stanford Computer
Archive of Language Materials. Godman (1982) proposes teaching verbs in semantic
fields organized hierarchically. For example, under break, are subordinate related
words that represent different breaking actions on physical objects: snap, crumble,

chip, and split. Under these words are others that represent the actions producing
successively smaller pieces; e.g., under split is crack and tear; under tear is rip and

rupture; under rip is shred; etc. Similarly, in an experiment conducted by Crow and
Quigley (1985), each semantic field is built around a "keyword ... that the students
would probably know" (p. 502). For example, under the keyword anger, they
include types of anger: ''fury, ire, wrath, indignation" (p. 502). An alternative to a
hierarchical organization is the presentation of words within a grid that analyzes the
components of the meanings of the words; for example, chop, dice, cube, shred,

slice, mince, and grate are related under the semantic field "reducing to small pieces"
(Channell 1988, p. 91). Even though the concept of semantic fields invites some
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rather loose interpretations, the idea that words share aspects of meaning not only has
appeal as an organizing principle, but also has "a strong psychological reality for
language learners and users" (Carter and McCarthy 1988, p. 211).

Needed: Strategies for Vocabulary Teaching and Learning
Wh~ther

based on communicative functions or semantic relatedness, organizing

words according to central patterns of usage should be able to avoid some of the
weaknesses of earlier word lists that were based on the erroneous assumption that
there is a correlation between frequency and utility. As Richards (1974) and
Twaddell (1980) point out, these lists included words of doubtful utility and excluded
others that may have more utility. Also, the idea that a few 'basic' words can be
used to express many notions sometimes produces language that is unlike naturally
spoken English; for example, "I am able takes the place of I can" (Ogden 1934, p.
9). Furthermore, the words that occur the most frequently in everyday speech (as
much as 80%) have low information content, while the remaining less-frequent words
have content that is "crucial for communication" (Richards 1974, p. 72).
Since a majority of communicatively useful words occur infrequently, and
since there is a minimum of time available for classroom teaching, Twaddell (1980)
concludes that it is a "sheer impossibility to teach the learner what he will need" (p.
446). At the same time, he acknowledges that "the expansion of vocabulary is the
indispensible intermediate stage of FL [foreign language] acquisition" (p. 441).
Therefore, students need to learn a "strategy of massive vocabulary control" (p. 443).
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Twaddell's (1980) solution is to guide the students in developing the skill of
"sensible guessing ... the skill of inference from context" (pp. 448-449). Like the
native speaker of English, the ESL student brings to the reading process knowledge
about the world, knowledge about how language expresses meaning, and some
specific knowledge about English. The student can draw upon this knowledge to
interpret grammatical and pragmatic clues in order to understand the meaning in a
text and to learn the meanings and uses of words. Also like the native speaker, the
ESL student should develop a willingness "to tolerate a considerable degree of
vagueness" (pp. 448-457).
Twaddell's suggestion has become the predominant way of teaching
vocabulary. (A balanced analysis of the research is presented in Nation and Coady
1988.) However, it is vulnerable to criticism on several grounds. In the first place,
the ability to guess meaning in context depends on knowing the words that define that
context. Second, many of the words learned will probably be the same "somewhat
literary and arbitrary vocabulary" (Wilkins 1976, p. 4) for which the grammartranslation method has been criticized.

In effect, the approach still treats vocabulary

with benign neglect: expose the students to words in a reading context and hope for
the best. Furthermore, in taking this approach, some teachers seem to have made the
"faulty assumption ... that words do not have meaning outside of context" (Nilson
1976, p. 100). The opposite is true: "The meaning of the word as encountered in
the passage is contextually bound or limited, a particular realization of the concept
that the word expresses" (Summers 1988, p. 116). Therefore, perhaps the students
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should learn the basic meanings of words before discovering how that meaning is
affected by context (Nilson 1976).6
Even if there is a value to teaching words in a reading context, it "should not
have the negative effect of discouraging the initial learning "(or learning at some time)
of words in isolation" (Nation 1982, p. 24). Current research in vocabulary is
reinforcing the idea that some vocabulary should be taught directly. Good candidates
for direct teaching include core words, semantic fields, procedural vocabulary as well
as the more specific words in ESP courses, collocations and other lexical sets, and
lexical phrases. In effect, this research is breaking down the total English lexicon
into smaller, more manageable units that should be useful in devising strategies for
both teaching and learning vocabulary.

DEAD METAPHORS AS VOCABULARY ITEMS

The so-called 'dead' metaphors are also good candidates for direct teaching.
They are abundant in everyday speech and writing, and new ones are continuously
evolving. Many of them can be integrated into other vocabulary sets such as lexical
phrases and core words. Like words that are related in semantic fields, the related
senses of a dead metaphor as well as related words and expressions can also be taught
simultaneously. In addition, if the ESL student understands the process of metaphoric
extension, which creates dead metaphors, then that knowledge can be used as a
strategy for independent learning.
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A more precise defini1tion of metaphor will be explored in Chapter II; Chapter
III will describe the process of metaphoric extension and propose a possible

explanation of how a novel metaphor becomes a 'dead' one. At this point, I simply
want to suggest through examples that dead metaphors are part of a central pattern of
word usage. 7
In general terms, a word or a phrase is recognized as a dead metaphor if we
use it in everyday speech with little or no consciousness of speaking metaphorically
even though one or more of its senses can be traced to a metaphoric origin.
Sometimes only etymology can discover that a supposed literal sense is in fact derived
from the metaphoric use of a word:

aftermath: a second mowing
browse: young shoots or twigs of bushes, trees, etc.
clue: a ball of yarn or thread
No metaphor could be more "dead' than these are. (See OED.)
However, when a metaphorical sense is detectable, the intuitions of native
speakers will vary. For example, some dead metaphors may conjure up a vaguely
metaphorical sense even though the original reference is unknown to most speakers;
e.g., to stonewall; springboard,· benchmark; landmark; milestone. Others may convey
a relatively strong metaphorical sense:
It was a blanket indictment.
The city had proposed axing the money from the budget.
He fleshed out his idea.
They set it up as a shell corporation.
There was a storm of protest.
The problems for Nixon snowballed after Watergate.
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Anechdotal evidence for a strong metaphorical sense includes puns, jokes, and
qualifying phrases such as so to speak. 8
However, many dead metaphors probably do not trigger any awareness of a
metaphorical sense:
The house faced the mountains.
I bank at the Hilltop branch.
Has he landed a job yet?
There were three key points in the proposal.
The situation hinges on the response of the U.S.
I'm swamped with work.
Certain foods can trigger an asthmatic attack.
On the other hand, if pressed, the native speaker of English will probably explain the
meaning of a dead metaphor in terms of comparison. For example, the sentence, I'm
swamped with work, may be explained as follows: "It's like I'm surrounded by a
swamp and don't see any way out." This is easiest to do when a metaphor is used
frequently but may not be quite 'dead' yet, which seems to be the case in these
examples:
The hostages say the bottom line remains the same--they are still
being held against their will.
In another effort at shuttle diplomacy, Baker is on his way to Egypt.
In any case, awareness of a metaphorical sense is not necessary in order to
understand the meaning of a dead metaphor, as the following examples illustrate:
East Germans are flooding into West Berlin.
People are flocking to buy guns and security hardware.
Pockets of troops were seen along the Saudi Arabian border as
Hussein's troops swept across Kuwait.
The meeting between Bush and Kaifu helped to spur the settlement.
A Federal-State battle is brewing over the proposed tax increases.
The Commissioner dished out punishment to Steinbrenner.
Two Soviet cosmonauts have been stranded in space since February.
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Gorbachev is insisting that the negotiations be frozen.
More money is being pumped into into drug programs.
This is not afringe movement. . .it is a mainstream movement.
The U.S. version of the trade agreement will be watered down .
. . . the savings and loan bailout
... a simple new test to weed out drugs that don't work
... a groundswell of public opinion
... an agreement on a ceiling for troop levels in Europe
... a cliff-hanger election
... a watershed election
... to drum up financial support
... a roadblock for the prosecution
In expressions such as these, a metaphorical sense has become conventionalized to the

extent that it is used and understood as a literal sense.
Conventionalizing a metaphorical sense brings many dead metaphors into the
realm of a core vocabulary, according to some of Carter's (1987a) criteria. It
establishes many phrasal verbs and verb-plus-preposition units:
I was polishing off my breakfast when ...
I need to polish up my writing.
It dawned on him that. ..
It boils down to this ...
They keyed in on the enormous cost of the program.
Conventionalization also establishes collocations for many dead metaphors:

foot of a mountain/hill/page/line/bed
bed of flowers/roses/clover/hay/a river/a stream
stream of people/speech/thought/consciousness
floor of an ocean/forest/canyon
bitter truth/cold/experience/argument/opposition/resentment/
changes
winning/losing streak; streak of luck/good fortune/bad luck/
misfortune
storm of protest
heat wave
cold snap
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Numerous compounds become dead metaphors: ballpark, blackmail, brainchild,

brainstorm, bulldoze, centerpiece, cherry-pick, deadlock, dead-ringer, feedback,
hallmark, hotspot, ironclad, millstone, network, offshoot, nosedive, overboard,
piecemeal, side-rail, side-track, showdown, standpoint, stonewall, touchstone,
whirlwind, windfall, etc. Carter also says that a core word is used in many idioms,
many of which could be regarded as metaphoric 'chunks'.
Some of those chunks of varying length--the lexical phrases--that Nattinger
(1988) says we stitch together are formed out of dead metaphors; for example:
core/the core of/at the core of
shed light: shed some/a little/more/further/more illuminating
light
breaking point: up to/beyond/near the breaking point
stand: as it/things (now) stand
Similarly, the organization of some words into semantic fields would have to be based
on the extension of meaning achieved by the use of dead metaphors. For example,
within the conceptual field of plants, words used metaphorically include blade, bloom,

blossom, bear fruit, branch, bud, core, flourish, flower, fruit, fruition, germ,
genninate, grassroots, kernel, leaf, mushroom, offshoot, plant, root, shoot, sprout,
stem, stump and twig.
Another reason to consider dead metaphors as part of a central process of
word usage is that so often they involve conversion, which is very productive in
English: verbalization, nominalization, adverbialization, and adjectivialization. The
most productive conversion is probably the use of a noun as a verb (verbalization);
some non-metaphoric examples are:
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We need to transition the students into the mainstream curriculum.
She prefers to conference with her students about their writing.
They all choppered to Camp David.
We amnestied over 3 million aliens.
The guards shouldered their rifles.
He was benched for the rest of the game.
Everyday speech is peppered with novel metaphors that involve conversion:
That's a problem that a lot of analysts have noodled .
... as Musgrave tries to submarine to the 22-yard line.
Left-handed, he [Mickey Mantle] would golf the ball. Righthanded, he would tomahawk the ball.
We're sort of arm-chair-quarterbacking this [Persian Gulf war].
But examples of conversion in using dead metaphors are also plentiful:
Drexel is saying, "We're being scapegoated."
Israel weathered another scud missile attack last night.
We need to mainstream the students.
Oil prices are skyrocketing.
He bootstrapped his way up to his present job.
She breezed into the room.
They spearheaded the campaign to change the name of the street.
Does this idea dovetail with your own?
Two militants barged into a farm and killed the residents.
Snow blanketed the city last night.
The competition blind-sided them.
His staff was button-holing him.
They fingered him for the crime.
She shouldered her responsibilities like a trooper.
The firm is saddled with debt.
Many adjectives with strong collocations can also be traced to metaphoric origins:
She was petrified.
I was devastated .
... naked aggression
.. .skyrocketing prices
.. .astronomical prices
.. .biting satire
... a shattering experience
... a knee-jerk reaction
... a thorny problem

/
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... a crusty old man
... a ballpark figure
.. .a.fiery speech
... ajledgling democracy
.. .a dirty/filthy trick
.. .filthy rich
.. .liquid cash
.. .fluid speech
... the fau:y boundaries of word meaning
These and similar examples suggest that, in ESL teaching, it is insufficient
merely to label such metaphors as idioms, slang, colloquial expressions, figurative
speech, polysemous words, or even 'dead'. They are not just metaphors that have
lost their metaphorical senses. On the contrary, the fact that they can be recognized
or construed as metaphors suggests that the metaphorical sense lives on.
Consequently, "past metaphors--now taken as literal--can generally be retrieved as
metaphors" (Kittay 1987, p. 20). More important, dead metaphors become
established in the lexicon through a process in which a word or a phrase is used
metaphorically, and then, if the metaphorical sense continues to communicate intended
meaning in various contexts, it becomes used and understood as either a literal sense
or a conventional sense. The process is metaphoric extension, and it is a central
pattern of word usage.

CONCLUSION

The acquisition of vocabulary by ESL students could be facilitated by more
direct teaching of vocabulary as well as by more strategies for independent vocabulary
learning. Research that identifies and describes central patterns of word usage may
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provide the teacher with some tools for organizing and presenting large blocks of
vocabulary items, thus overcoming some of the time constraints in the classroom. In
tum, teaching not only the vocabulary but also the patterns of usage.may provide the
student with some tools for developing strategies for independent learning. The
process of metaphoric extension should be included among those central patterns of
word usage that are adding "new dimensions to our view of vocabulary" (Carter and
McCarthy 1988, p. 201).
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NOTES

1

This is not to say that there has been no work on the direct teaching of

vocabulary. Some of the more !audible approaches include Gaims and Redman
(1986), Rudzka, et. al. (1981;1985), and Wallace (1982).
2

Channell (1988) contradicts this idea:

For Ll [first-language], research on the nature of the mental lexicon is
reasonably well developed, with research findings and resultant models
available. (p. 83)
However, the multitude of conflicting theories and models of memory do not justify
such optimism. Rather, it is more prudent to accept Tulving's (1985)
unassailable assumption that most, if not all, of our currently held ideas
and theories about mental processes are wrong and that sooner or later
in the future they will be replaced with more adequate concepts,
concepts that fit nature better. (p. 386)
3

A related concept proposed by Winter (reported in Carter and McCarthy

1988) is that inherent in the semantics of some words is a "text-structuring" function:
... these words signal the logic of a text, they link parts of texts to one
another, they encapsulate chunks of text and refer back, forth and out
into the world in a way comparable to how pronouns operate ... acting
as a half-way house between the grammar words and the lexical words
of English. The list.. .includes achieve, addition, basis, cause,

compare, differ, explanation, feature, kind, method, opposite, point,
problem, result, situation, truth, way and many more. (pp. 207-208)
4

For example, when my wife was in the fifth grade, she told her family that

she had to bring some "kemivents" to class each week. Her brother tried to explain
that the term was "current events," but she told him he was crazy; her teacher had
said they were "kemivents," and she knew better than he did.
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s One cause of this inadequacy may be that the influence of sociolinguistic

factors is not always taken into account. The essential question to be answered is to
what extent semantic relatedness is determined by conventional usage as opposed to
dictionary definition.
6

Another criticism is that research has not yet shown conclusively that

learning words in context facilitates learning (Carter and McCarthy 1988; Nation
1982; Nation and Coady 1988). However, this is hardly a fair criticism because the
same could be said of any other method of teaching vocabulary. In fact, in one study
of English-speaking eighth-graders, the authors conclude:
For any given small set of words, it is easy to show that direct
vocabulary instruction is superior to learning from context. .. But if one
asks a different question--what approach to vocabulary can more
effectively lead to the acquisition of several thousand words per year-our results indicate that learning from context would be an easy winner
(Nagy, Herman, and Anderson 1985, p. 251).
Of course, this is not to say that the same results would be found in ESL students.
7

All the examples were taken from conversations, radio and television news

broadcasts, radio talk shows, television shows, newspapers, and popular magazines
such as Newsweek. I tried to select those that are topical as well as commonly heard
in order to establish veracity without burdening the reader with citations for each
source.
Some of these examples could be identified as involving metonymy,
synechdoche, personification, hyperbole, or some other trope of similarity. However,
I am using metaphor in an inclusive sense for two reasons. First, many such tropes
could be either metaphoric or non-metaphoric. Second, a discussion relating
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metaphor to other figures of speech veers away from the central goal of understanding
metaphoric extension as a central pattern of word usage. Why I consider these
particular expressions to be metaphoric should become clearer in Chapter II.
8

For example, referring to school officials who applied first-aid to a child who

had cut off the tip of her finger, a radio talk-show host said, "I thought that the
people on hand, so to speak, did a good job."

CHAPTER II

WANTED DEAD OR ALIVE:
A PRECISE DEFINITION OF METAPHOR

In order to teach a vocabulary based on metaphoric extension, the ESL teacher

needs a clear definition of metaphor. The standard definition found (in slightly
varying versions) in any good dictionary or encyclopedia is clear, and in fact, it is the
definition the teacher will have to use because it will be referred to by the students.
However, it is too brief to account for either the process of metaphoric extension or
the abundance of dead metaphors in everyday speech. Therefore, the teacher will
need to augment this definition with a more precise explanation. To this end, the
objective of this chapter is to develop a clearer understanding of what metaphor is by
examining some of the dominant views on metaphor. The results of this analysis
should also facilitate the selection of a vocabulary based on the process of metaphoric
extension.
A convenient way of sorting out these views is to recognize that some of them
. analyze metaphor essentially within the framework of more traditional concepts, while
others concentrate on the cognitive significance of metaphor. Most views are neither
strictly 'traditional' nor strictly 'cognitive', and there are potential problems in trying
to rely exclusively on either framework.
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In the traditional framework, a precise accounting of metaphor may be limited
by the tendency to treat metaphor as an artistic literary device, or verbal adornment,
rather than as a central pattern of word usage. (For example, see Henle 1958; Hester
1967; Levin 1988; and Perrine 1971). This is one reason that the traditional
(standard) definition of metaphor as an implied comparison is criticized for being
inadequate and vague (Black 1962; Moore 1982; Ortony 1980b). Quine (1979) says
that metaphor
flourishes in playful prose and high poetic art, but it is vital also at the
growing edges of science and philosophy ... It is a mistake ... to think of
linguistic usage as literalistic in its main body and metaphorical in its
trimming. (pp. 159-160)
If Quine is correct, then metaphor must have a role in cognition. This aspect of

metaphor is neglected by discussing only its literary role.
In contrast, proponents of cognitive views believe the study of metaphor can
reveal something about how the mind conceptualizes experience (M. G. Johnson and
Malgady 1980; Lakoff and M. Johnson 1980a, 1980b; Schon 1979; Verbrugge 1980).
It is a belief based in part on the recognition that metaphors are pervasive in everyday

speech (Harris, et. al. 1980; M. G. Johnson and Malgady 1980; Lakoff and M.
Johnson 1980a, 1980b); for example: "That metaphor is pervasive in language is an
aspect of its prominent place in the structure of thought itselr' (Kittay 1987, p. 326).
Attempts to discover the cognitive significance of metaphor are expanding
metaphor beyond the idea that it is a figure of speech; i.e., "saying one thing in terms
of something else" (Barnet, et. al. 1960, p. 41). In the cognitive framework,
metaphor is a "figure of thought" (Lakoff 1986, p. 215), and the concept of metaphor
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ranges from 'seeing' one thing in terms of another (Black 1962) to 'experiencing' one
thing in terms of another (Johnson 1987; La.koff and Johnson 1980a; 1980b). The
resulting analyses are providing more precise theories about what metaphor is, how
metaphor expresses meaning, and how we comprehend that meaning.
However, some cognitive views may be causing another vagueness by seeing
underlying metaphors in almost any expression. For example, Richards (1936) asserts
that "metaphor is the omnipresent principle of language" (p. 92). A stronger claim is
that "metaphorical talk is temporally and logically prior to literal talk" (Cooper 1986,
p. 257). Stronger still is the claim by La.koff and Johnson (1980a):
Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language, but in
thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which
we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
(p. 454)
These kinds of statements suggest that the expanded concept of metaphor offered by
some cognitive views may be tantamount to saying that there is no distinct expression
known as metaphor. If we believe that all language is inherently metaphoric, then we
deny literal meaning; "if we deny the literal in language, we deny the possibility of
metaphor as well" (Kittay 1987, p. 20). In addition, as Booth (1979) points out,
there is a problem for students of any subject when the word for that
subject expands to cover everything ... Metaphor has by now been
defined in so many ways that there is no human expression ... that could
not be metaphoric in someone's definition ... Surely when a word can
mean everything it risks meaning nothing. (p. 48)
Yet intuitively we know that "the rules of our language determine that some
expressions must count as metaphors" (Black 1962, p. 29).
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For the ESL teacher, the main problem is how to teach metaphor as a distinct
kind of expression without restricting it to its literary role. A first step toward a
solution is to accept the premise that the literary use of metaphor is "a refinement
upon one of the commonest devices of ordinary speech" (Waldron 1967, p. 167). But
there are other issues as well. We know when we have heard or read a metaphor, but
how do we know that? Furthermore, how do we explain to an ESL student that one
expression in English (She shouldered her responsibilities) is a metaphor, and a
similar one (She shouldered her rifle) is not, or that what might seem to be a
metaphor (It dawned on him) is really 'dead'? 1 In order to explain why something is
identified as a metaphor, we need to understand (at least hypothetically and
e:

:::::>

tentatively) how it communicates its meaning. Finally, since metaphor is pervasive in
everyday speech, we also need to be able to explain why we use metaphor.
Therefore, although the distinction between traditional and cognitive views will
serve organizational purposes, the following examination of some of the dominant
views will be more concerned with how any view provides answers to these three,
interdependent questions: how we identify a metaphor, how a metaphor
communicates its meaning, and why we use metaphors. Since every major view is in
part an effort to explain, augment, or transcend Aristotle's concept of metaphor, it is
necessary to begin by looking closely at Aristotle's discussion of metaphor in Poetics
and Rhetoric.
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ARISTOTLE'S DISCUSSION OF METAPHOR
Aristotle (The Revised Oxford Translation, 1984) identifies metaphor as the
substitution of one term for another:
Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to something
else; the transference being either from genus to species, or from
species to genus, or from species to species, or on grounds of analogy.
(p. 2332)
The transference is not just of a noun (or 'name'), for Aristotle's examples include
verbs, phrases, riddles, proverbs, and hyperboles. (See pp. 2238-2257.) What has
since become known as synecdoche includes both 'genus to species' and 'species to
genus' transference:
That from genus to species is exemplified in 'here stands my ship'; for
lying at anchor is a sort of standing. [The whole is substituted for the
part.] That from species to genus [part for the whole] in 'Truly ten
thousand good deeds has Ulysses wrought', where 'ten thousand',
which is a particular large number, is put in place of the generic 'a
large number'. (p. 2332)
The 'species to species' transference is using one word where another one with a
related sense could have been used:
in 'Drawing the life with the bronze,' and in 'Severing with the
enduring bronze'; where the poet uses 'draw' in the sense of 'sever'
and 'sever' in that of 'draw', both words meaning 'take away'
something. (p. 2332)
In analogy, it is a matter of putting the fourth term "in place of the second, and the
second in place of the fourth" (p. 2332).
However, not just any word can be put in place of another and still be
identified as a metaphor. Aristotle believes that the use of metaphor is "a sign of
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genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars" (p. 2335). Here and in other statements, he seems to be implying that
metaphoric substitution is possible only when there is similarity either in the two
subjects referred to or in the meanings of the words used. For example, both a man
and a lion have the trait of courage:
The simile also is a metaphor; the difference is but slight. When the
poet says: 'He leapt on the foe as a lion', this is a simile; when he
says of him 'the lion leapt', it is a metaphor--here, since both are
courageous, he has transferred to Achilles the name of 'lion'.
(p. 2243))
In the preceding example of substituting the sense of sever for that of draw, and vice
versa, the similarity is in the meanings of the two words.
Metaphor communicates similarity in dissimilars in two ways:
By making our hearers see things ... I mean using expressions that
represent things as in a state of activity ... and by the further power of
surprising the hearer; because the hearer expected something different,
his acquisition of the new idea impresses him all the more. (pp. 22522253)
Consequently, Aristotle regards metaphor as one of the most effective ways of using
language because "it is from metaphor that we can best get hold of something
fresh ... a new idea, a new fact" (p. 2250).
Presenting new ideas in this manner is not the only reason we use metaphors.
Some metaphors are necessary. For example, some provide names for terms that
have no name of their own ... Thus to cast forth seed-corn is called
'sowing'; but to cast forth its flame, as said of the sun, has no special
name. This namelass act, however, stands in just the same relation to
its object, sunlight, as sowing to the seed-corn. Hence the expression
in the poet, 'sowing around a god-created flame.' (p. 2333)
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In addition, metaphor belongs to that class of "unfamiliar terms" (including foreign
terms, ornamental equivalents, coined words, and words that are lengthened,
curtailed, or altered) which are "necessary ... [because they] save language from
seeming mean and prosaic, while ordinary words will secure the requisite clearness"
(pp. 2333-2334).
We also use metaphor because it adds to the ordinary use of language
"clearness, charm, and distinction as nothing else can" (p. 2240). Since Aristotle is
primarily interested in metaphor as a rhetorical or poetic device, he frequently
describes appropriate use and form; for example: "The materials of metaphor must
be beautiful to the ear, to the understanding, to the eye or some other physical sense"
(p. 2241). However, this is not saying that metaphor is limited to literary adornment,
for Aristotle recognizes its pervasiveness in everyday speech: "These two classes of
terms, the proper or regular and the metaphorical--these and no others--are used by
everybody in conversation" (p. 2240).
In sum, Aristotle says that metaphor is the transference of a term to a
dissimilar subject, achieved by putting one term in place of another, which expresses
the speaker's perception of 'similarity in dissimilars'. It is a form of word usage that
is not only rhetorically and poetically valuable but also necessary. The central
concept is 'similarity in dissimilars', and this is the point of departure for traditional
and cognitive views. Because Aristotle says metaphor makes the hearer 'see' the
similarity, thereby grasping a new idea, some interpreters say that he is an early
proponent of the cognitive significance of metaphor (Johnson 1980; Kittay 1987;
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Ricoeur 1979). Cognitive views propose that verbal metaphor reflects how the mind
works; how it creates similarity as a way of understanding experiences, phenomena,
and concepts. In contrast, traditional views tend to follow the interpretation that
Aristotle regards metaphor as a way of making a comparison; the similarity preexists, either in physical reality or in the meanings of the words, and metaphor is a
way of expressing it.

SIMILARITY IN THE TRADITIONAL FRAMEWORK

If asked to define metaphor, most of us would probably recall the traditional

definition taught in high school English classes: metaphor is a figure of speech that
makes an implicit comparison, as opposed to the explicit comparison made by another
figure of speech, the simile. Therefore, in the following examples, (1), (2) and (3)
are similes while (4) through (7) are metaphors:
1) The ship was like a ghost.

2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

The
The
The
The
The
The

man ate like a wolf.
ship, a veritable ghost, loomed on the horizon.
ship was a ghost.
man is a wolf.
man wolfed down his food.
ghost [referring to a ship] loomed on the horizon.

Since both a metaphor and a simile say the same thing, a metaphor is an abbreviated,
or elliptical, simile.
However, metaphor is more than simply eliminating a word such as like. For
example, in (4), a ghost is substituted for another subject complement, such as

enshrouded in a gray mist, vaporous and evanascent as a ghost; in (6), wolfed down
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his food is substituted for another verb phrase, such as tore at his food the way a wolf
might do. In effect, there is a "substitution of a non-literal phrase for a literal

phrase" (Ortony et. al. 1978, p. 921), and the result expresses "a comparison between
essentially unlike things ... the literal term and the figurative term" (Perrine 1971, p.
125). Consequently, the traditional way of defining metaphor is both a 'comparison
view' and a 'substitution view' (Black 1962).

Metaphor as Substitution
If the aspect of substitution is emphasized, there is a tendency to regard

metaphor as "somehow special, deviant, anomalous, or different from normal
language" (Johnson and Malgady 1980, p. 259). This idea derives from Aristotle's
observation that metaphor replaces a word or phrase with another that 'belongs to
something else', which probably reflects the assumption of Greek rhetoricians that
"every word had its true and correct meaning" (Waldron 1967, p. 44). However,
defining metaphor as a substitution does not explain why some substitutions are not
metaphors. For example, why are the sentences in (a) metaphoric while those in (b)
are not?
a) She shouldered her responsibilities.
Tanks shouldered up to the central bank in Kuwait City.
b) She shouldered her rifle.
He shouldered his way through the crowd.
The traditional answer is that only the (a) sentences make comparisons. Therefore,
even if the aspect of substitution is emphasized, it is almost never discussed without
involving the issue of comparison.
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Hester (1967) points out that Aristotle's discussion is usually interpreted to
mean that metaphor is "essentially a decoration or ornament to enliven [literary]
style" (p. 14). In support, he expresses his own view:
Reading is the stance appropriate to metaphor.. .Reading ... with regard
to metaphor essentially involves imagery ... I argue that metaphor
essentially involves imagery while literal writing does not. (pp. 117133)

However, this is not true of all metaphors, for some are "nearly impossible to
imagine in a perceptual manner ... [e.g.,] Dreams are the judicial system of the
unconscio-us" (Reichman and Coste 1980, p. 184). Furthermore, non-metaphoric

language can also produce strong images, as Hemingway's style demonstrates so well:
Nick looked down into the clear, brown water, colored from the pebbly
bottom, and watched the trout keeping themselves steady in the current
with wavering fins. (Hemingway 1938, p. 209)
Therefore, perhaps Hester is only saying that metaphor is used more frequently to
evoke images. In any case, Hester's view is representative of the traditional tendency
to focus on the use of metaphor in writing.
Even when a traditional view recognizes the conversational use of metaphor,
the emphasis is still on comparison achieved by substitution. For example, Grice
(1975) says that metaphor "flouts" the maxim (in his "cooperative principle") to be
truthful. Using the example You are the cream in my coffee, he says the hearer
knows that
it cannot be THAT that such a speaker is trying to get across. The
most likely supposition is that the speaker is attributing to his audience
some feature or features in respect of which the audience resembles
(more or less fancifully) the mentioned substance. (p. 53)
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The hearer draws "conversational implicatures" (p. 45) about the statement, and
consequently, the substitution of a false statement for a normally expected truthful one
somehow tells the hearer that some kind of similarity is being expressed. 2
Searle (1979) explains the substitution by making a distinction between
intended meaning and the spoken or written expression, calling "the former speaker's

utterance meaning, and the latter, word, or sentence meaning" (p. 93). Searle asserts
that metaphor, irony, and indirect speech acts are examples of how a speaker "is able
to mean more than, or something different from, what he says" (p. 93). In each case,
the speaker substitutes one statement for another that could have expressed the
intended meaning directly. With irony, the hearer knows the opposite is intended.
With an indirect speech act, the hearer knows something more is intended; e.g., It's

hot in here means exactly that, plus Open the window. Metaphor always expresses
the speaker's utterance meaning, but not the sentence meaning. The primary strategy
for understanding the utterance meaning is this : "Where the utterance is defective if
taken literally, look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning"
(p. 114).
Matthews' (1971) anomaly view also regards metaphor as a substitution
comprehended in two stages. Metaphor is an anomaly because the substitution
violates certain semantic rules, resulting in an expression that is "semantically
deviant" (p. 419). This view is based on the Katz-Fodor componential theory of
semantics (Katz and Fodor 1963), which claims that words have several senses, each
of which can be represented abstractly by semantic features or markers. For
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example, man may be represented as [+HUMAN], [+MALE], [+ADULT], etc.;

wolf may be represented as [+ANIMAL], [+CANINE], [+PREDATORY], etc.
Each of these features may be further defined: human includes [+PRIMATE],
[+LINGUISTIC], [+GREGARIOUS]. Using these two terms in the metaphor, The

man is a wolf, violates selectional restriction rules, or rules about selecting lexical
items for a grammatically well-formed sentence. At the very least, man is
[+HUMAN], and wolf is [+CANINE], and therefore it is patently false that the two
can be equated. The hearer attempts a literal interpretation and, failing in that, seeks
a non-literal interpretation (Loewenberg 1975; Matthews 1971). Quoting Chomsky
(1965), Matthews (1971) explains that "these deviant sentences 'are interpreted by
direct analogy to well-formed sentences that observe the selectional-restriction rules in
question'" (p. 419).
The strongest criticism of the anomaly view is that some statements "could be
used either literally or metaphorically" (Morgan 1979, p. 137), depending on the
context. One frequently-cited example is The rock is becoming brittle with age. The
words in this sentence have not violated any selectional restriction rules because the
sentence may refer literally to a rock; yet when the sentence refers to an old
professor, it is a metaphor (Morgan 1979; Ortony 1980a). Some metaphors can be
semantically anomalous regardless of context; e.g., The crowd floated up the

courthouse steps. However, it is not true that, in order to identify a metaphor, "the
presence of a selectional restriction violation is a necessary and sufficient condition"
(Matthews 1971, p. 424).
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The anomaly view may help identify some metaphors, and regarding metaphor
as an indirect way of speaking, as a flouting of a conversational maxim, or as a
literary ornament may suggest some reasons we use metaphors, but the emphasis on
substitution provides little insight into how a metaphor communicates its meaning. It
does not explain how the hearer knows that the statement is not a lie, an
exaggeration, an ironic comment, or a mistake that merely expresses ambiguity.
Furthermore, describing how a word or an expression is used in an abnormal way
does not necessarily tell the hearer in what way it is being used (Ortony 1980b).
Once we have recognized that someone has used a metaphor, and we know that the
intended meaning is something different from what it first appears to be, how do we
know what the metaphorical meaning is; i.e., what is that non-literal interpretation we
are supposed to make?

Metaphor as Comparison
The emphasis on comparison in the traditional framework is an attempt to
answer this question by explaining how metaphor expresses 'similarity in dissimilars'.
Aristotle used metaphor to refer to the transfer of one term into a context in which
another term normally would be used. Since then, the Greek roots (meta, 'over', and

pherein, 'to carry') have been reinterpreted (Waldron 1967), which has resulted in a
"fairly wide agreement that metaphor involves, or is, the transfer of meaning"
(Ortony 1975, p. 45).
In order for meaning to be transferred, there must be two terms even though
there is a substitution. For example, the word ship does not appear in the metaphor,
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The ghost loomed on the horizon, but (given the appropriate context) the hearer knows

that the speaker is referring to a ship. The dissimilarity between the two referents
surprises the hearer and prompts a search for similarity. Since it is assumed that a
metaphor is an abbreviated simile, the similarity may be discovered by transforming
the metaphor into a simile: The ship loomed on the horizon like a ghost. If the
similarity is there, then somehow some of the meaning of ghost has been transferred
to ship, or to the concept of ship. However, "it is an understatement to say that the
mechanism of this transference is not well understood" (Miller 1979, p. 221).
One way of explicating the idea is to say that the transference is an extension
of the literal meaning. Henle (1958) suggests that transfer may be too strong because
some of the similarity may be "antecedent" and some of it "induced" (p. 191). The
antecedent similarity already exists, either in the meanings of the words or in realworld conditions. It enables metaphor to show how one term symbolizes another
through analogy; rather than transferring meaning, metaphor extends this "parallel
structure" (p. 180). Metaphor may also induce similarity by
infusing the symbolized situation with the feeling belonging to the one
which functions as the symbol...[i.e.,] an aura of the feeling in the one
case pervades the other. (p.191)
On a more rational basis, Waldron (1967) says that in addition to the "emotive
force ... [and] suggestiveness" (p. 166) of some metaphors, in general
metaphor enlarges the semantic range of words, momentarily or
permanently changing the frontiers of our lexical categories ...
Metaphor is a transfer of category-names on the basis of some common
criterion between the two categories. (p. 180)
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Shibles (1971) adds the idea that this is possible because "there is an intuitively
grasped core meaning which every word has and which cannot be fixed to mean one
thing only" (p. 90). This core meaning is extended when there is "the transference of
a word or phrase from one universe of discourse to another" (p. 77).
As suggested by the phrases universe of discourse, lexical categories, and

parallel structures, the problem of how metaphor expresses the comparison is broader
than the idea that there is a transfer of meaning from one word to another. The two
terms of a metaphor are not just two words, as might seem to be the case in The man

is a wolf and The ghost loomed on the horizon. It is more precise to say that there
are two different referents; i.e., "what is normally designated by the word ... and what
is designated by it in its metaphoric use--its actual referent" (Waldron 1967, p. 162).
Therefore, wolf refers to both an animal and a man, and ghost refers to both a
supposed apparition and a ship. However, to be even more precise, the meaning that
emerges from the metaphoric use is distinctly different from the literal meaning of
either referent: wolf is neither the animal nor the man, but something at once both
more than and less than either one. This 'something' is usually called metaphorical
meaning.
Perhaps this is best illustrated by a metaphor submerged in a context, such as
the following cathedral metaphor in E. B. White's (1944) essay, "Once More to the
Lake":

One summer, along about 1904, my father rented a camp on a lake in
Maine ... [Retuming years later] I wondered how time would have
marred this unique, this holy spot. . .I guess I remembered clearest of all
the early mornings .. I would dress softly so as not to wake the others,
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and sneak out into the sweet outdoors and start out in the canoe,
keeping close along the shore in the long shadows of the pines. I
remembered being very careful never to rub my paddle against the
gunwale for fear of disturbing the stillness of the cathedral.
(pp. 246-247)
White is not just extending the literal meaning of cathedral, nor is he simply using a
false, logically absurd, or semantically deviant sentence to say what he really intends.
What he intends is a metaphorical meaning of cathedral. Since it is a 'holy spot', the
reader knows that the metaphorical meaning includes everything to which cathedral
refers: not just a stereotypical structure, but a whole set of experiences, values,
beliefs, etc. that the reader associates with the word. At the same time, in this text,

cathedral refers to the lake, or more accurately, to the narrator's experience of the
lake. This experience includes his values, beliefs, hopes, dreams, memories, and
recalled emotions, as well as his perception of stillness, peace, tranquility, purity,
spiritual power, and certainly much more. In other words, the word used
metaphorically, cathedral, has two referents: (1) the object to which the reader might
expect it to refer, including a set of connotations, and (2) the lake to which it does
refer, including the reader's inferences about the narrator's experience of that scene.
In either case, this cathedral is more than (and less than) any particular structure that
might be called cathedraf; this cathedral is metaphorical.
The problem is this: how does a metaphor construct a semantic relationship
between two terms so that the hearer (or reader) understands the metaphorical
meaning? More specifically, how does a metaphor reveal the similarity between the
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two referents for the word used metaphorically when those referents are so different
from each other?
One approach to this problem is suggested by Frye's (1967) analogy between
'pure literature' and 'pure mathematics': each is

"concern~

more and more with its

inner integrity, and less and less with its reference to external criteria" (p. 351). Like
rational and irrational numbers, the two terms of a metaphor "depend for their
meaning solely on the interrelations of the subject itselr' (p. 351). Metaphor is a way
of naming (or renaming) something, as a decimal names a fraction. Like the
equation, metaphor is a tautology and creates a "hypothetical identification" (p. 352).
Turbayne (1962) makes a similar argument, but significantly incorporates the
fact that people are involved--speakers/writers and hearers/readers. Consequently
there is an "as if or make-believe feature" (p. 17) to metaphor. Turbayne refers to
the substitution as a kind of "sort-crossing" (p. 11), and says that in using a metaphor
we are creating a "duality of sense" (p. 17) by treating one thing as if it belonged to
some other sort of thing. Pragmatically, "the use of metaphor involves the pretense
that something is the case when it is not" (p. 13); e.g., that a man is a wolf.
Furthermore, we are asking our audience to participate in this pretense.
Semantically, the term used metaphorically is given two senses; e.g., "the literal and
the metaphorical senses of 'wolf" (p. 15).
In short, the use of metaphor involves both the awareness of duality of
sense and the pretense that the two different senses are one. To Dr.
Johnson's remark that metaphor "gives you two ideas for one," we
need to add that it gives you two ideas as one. (p. 17)
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One idea is that wolf can refer to the feral canine, and the other is that in a
hypothetical, 'as ir context of agreed-upon pretense, wolf can also refer
(metaphorically) to a man.
In Miller's (1979) defense of metaphor as an abbreviated simile, the dual
senses converge into a set of "missing properties [that, for example,] are understood
to be something attributable to both wolves and men" (p. 241). Miller draws a

parallel between the reading process and the comprehension of a metaphor, saying
that in both, "new things are learned by being related to things already known" (p.
202). Metaphor states something that does not fit in with our "familiar conceptual
system" (p. 202); it is not true in fact. Therefore, we accept the context in which the
metaphor is stated as a "semantic model" (p. 206) and look for truth in the model. In
other words, readers of metaphors
assume that what the author said is true in the state of affairs he is
describing, then search their general knowledge for plausible grounds
for saying that in the given context. Their search, however, is guided
by whatever resemblance and analogies they can find between the world
of the text and the world of reality. (p. 214)
In The man is a wolf, the old information (what we know) is that man and wolf refer
to two different objects, and the new information is that, in a given context, they may
be seen to resemble each other. "Finding that resemblance can be viewed as a
process of paraphrasing the metaphor as a comparison statement" (p. 219).

Paraphrasability: A Problem for Comparison Views
The most common assumption among traditional views is that we comprehend
a metaphor by paraphrasing it as an explicit statement of comparison. However, it is
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an oversimplification to say that a metaphor can be paraphrased as a simile because
similes may be either literal or metaphorical; for example:
la) The crystal is like a block of ice.
lb) Sally is like a block of ice
2a) The dog is like a wolf.
2b) The man is like a wolf.
According to the standard definition of metaphor, the presence of like makes each of
these sentences a simile, or an explicit comparison. But in (lb), any similarity
between Sally and a block of ice is only metaphorical. "Even if we were to throw in
the various beliefs that people have about blocks of ice, they still would not be
literally true of Sally" (Searle, 1979, p. 107). The same argument could be applied
to (2b); a man is not in any literal way like a wolf. In other words, "the explicit
statement of comparison that is supposed to underlie the metaphor is itself
metaphorical in nature" (Ortony et. al. 1978, p. 940). Therefore, some similes may
be metaphors, but not all metaphors are similes.
It may be that any paraphrase only adds overt signals to a metaphoric

expression, for metaphors themselves can be stated in overt terms of comparison; for
example: "Patterson was a gamecock, moderate in height, wiry in build, jittery in
movement and irascible in expression" (Bernstein 1989, p. 151). The comparison is
not implied, and yet no matter how much the metaphor is elaborated upon, it is still a
metaphor and not a literal comparison because Patterson is a gamecock only in a
metaphorical sense. Also, the duality of sense is still prominent. The qualifying
phrases tell us how Patterson is similar to a gamecock, but we are aware that he is
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not a gamecock. At the same time, we accept the pretense that he is a gamecock if
by gamecock we mean to exhibit certain characteristics. In other words, since both
writer and reader know that Patterson cannot be literally similar to a gamecock, the
sentence is making a statement about Patterson as

if he were

similar to a gamecock. It

is the duality of sense, more than the substitution or the comparison, that makes this
statement a metaphor. Therefore, metaphor may be more than a substitution, more than
an implied comparison, and more than an abbreviated simile.
Furthermore, if a metaphor were only a statement of similarity, then we would
assume that the more similarity expressed, the better the metaphor. On the contrary,
"when there is too much similarity ... the metaphor becomes ... a literal statement of
resemblance or identity" (Tourangeau and Sternberg 1982, p. 208). "Indeed, it seems a
reasonable view that a metaphor is the opposite of an equation" (Empson 1964, p. 332).
Metaphorical meaning is about 'similarity in dissimilars', but as Frye, Turbayne, and
Miller point out, and as White's cathedral metaphor illustrates, it is more than a simple
one-thing-is-like-another-thing statement.

SIMILARITY IN THE COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK

The fact that the whole meaning of a metaphor cannot be paraphrased as a literal
statement of comparison provides the main impetus for substantiating the cognitive
significance of metaphor (Kittay 1987). Among cognitive views, a common theme is that
metaphorical meaning is not the product of using words metaphorically; "what is created
is not simply a new emphasis on some preexistent but hitherto, unnoticed aspect of
meaning or similarity" (Waggoner 1990, p. 93). Rather, the verbal metaphor is the
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product of a cognitive activity that might be called "metaphorical thought" (Black 1979a,
p. 3). Metaphor is a way of perceiving or understanding something; "metaphor is, at
root, a problem of knowing" (Verbrugge 1980, p. 87). I have chosen six views to
represent the cognitive framework, presented in this sequence: Richards (1936); Black
(1979a, et. al.); Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982); Lakoff and Johnson (1980a, et. al.);
Ortony (1980a, et. al.); and Kittay (1987). Kittay's theory is examined in more detail
than any other theory because of the new and useful insight it offers.

Three Interaction Views
The current interest in the cognitive significance of metaphor arises from
Richards' (1936) 'interaction' view. Richards identifies the two terms of a metaphor as
the tenor and the vehicle, and introduces two other influential terms as well: ground and

tension. The tenor is the "principle subject" (p. 97), and the vehicle is the term used
metaphorically. The similarity, or set of "common characteristics" (p. 117), is the

ground. The tension is the semantic incongruence caused by the "disparities" (p. 108)
between the tenor and the vehicle. Hence, in The ma.n is a wolf, the tenor is ma.n, and
the vehicle is wolf. To the extent that there is similarity in the ground, the hearer will be
able to compare them, but the tension caused by their dissimilarity signifies that it is not a
literal comparison.
Richards says, "If we cannot distinguish tenor from vehicle, then we may
provisionally take the word [or phrase] to be literal" (p. 119). For example, The dog is a

wolf would probably be taken to be a literal statement because there is a weak tension and
a strong ground between dog and wolf. In contrast, there is a strong tension and a weak
ground between ma.n and wolf in the metaphor, The ma.n is a wolf.
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For this reason, Richards emphasizes the role of the differences in expressing the
metaphorical meaning. Rather than similarity being revealed through the transfer of
meaning from the vehicle to the tenor, Richards says that there are "exchanges between
the meanings" (pp. 108-109) of the tenor and the vehicle. The metaphorical meaning will
derive in part from the similarities, "but the peculiar modification of the tenor which the
vehicle brings about is even more the work of their unlikenesses than of their likenesses"
(p. 127). Therefore, "we need the word 'metaphor' for the whole double unit" (p. 96),
and not just for the term used metaphorically.
In the simplest formulation, when we use a metaphor we have two
thoughts of different things active together and supported by a single word,
or phrase, whose meaning is a resultant of their interaction. (p. 93)
Since metaphor is "a borrowing and intercourse between thoughts" (p. 94), and not just
words, it has a cognitive role: "Thought is metaphoric, and proceeds by comparison, and
the metaphors of language derive therefrom" (p. 94).
While Richards seems to be implying that we use metaphor because that is the
way the mind works, Black's (1962; 1979a) interaction view describes metaphor as an
instrument for changing, compressing, and expanding concepts. 3 We use metaphor
because literal language is often insufficient for expressing "our sense of the rich
correspondences, interrelations, and analogies of domains conventionally separated"
(1979a, p. 34). This idea is almost identical to Aristotle's 'intuitive perception of the
similarity in dissimilars'. However, Aristotle could be interpreted to mean that the
similarity exists prior to the metaphoric statement. Black (1962) proposes that "it would
be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the
similarity" (p. 37).
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According to Black (1979a), the outcome of the interaction is "of course produced
in the minds of the speaker and hearer" (p. 29). In "strong metaphors" (p. 27), as
opposed to 'dead' metaphors, there are "unstated implications: Their producers need the
receiver's cooperation in perceiving what lies behind the words used" (p. 26). The words
used identify the primary subject (the tenor) and the secondary subject (the vehicle).
The metaphorical utterance works by "projecting upon" the primary
subject a set of "associated implications," comprised in the implicative
complex, that are predicable of the secondary subject. (p. 28)
In White's cathedral metaphor, the implicative complex of the secondary subject,
cathedral, might include :
(Cl) A cathedral is a place of expansive but limited space, diffuse light,
and tall columns that echo the faintest sounds
(C2) in which holy songs are sung, holy words spoken, holy thoughts
contemplated, and worship undertaken,
(C3) which brings the visitor a feeling of peace, tranquility, humility,
love, and an overwhelming sense of spiritual power.

Implications such as these (and not, for example, implications about architectural
characteristics) would be selected by the reader because the narrator had said that the lake
was a unique, holy place.
The interaction is initiated when this implicative complex is projected upon the
primary subject, a lake in Maine. The implicative complex of the primary subject
depends upon the interpretations that the speaker and hearer give to the implications of
the secondary subject. Therefore, a lake in Maine could have these implications:
(Ll) A place of... (same as Cl)
(L2) the experience of which is akin to that of holy places, but not
exactly the same,
(L3) which brings the visitor ... (same as C3)
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The primary subject is now seen in a new way, which "reciprocally induces parallel
changes in [the way we see] the secondary subject" (1979a, p. 29). By seeing the lake as
a cathedral, we also begin to see a cathedral as something more than (and less than) the
stereotypical structure; something rather like the lake. 4
Therefore, metaphor is not 'saying-as', but 'seeing-as'. "One thing is thought of
(or viewed) as another thing" (Black 1979b, p. 192). Black (1979a) says that this is a
more accurate way of explaining metaphor as an elliptical simile: metaphor is an
"instrument for drawing implications grounded in perceived analogies of structure
between two subjects belonging to different domains" (pp. 31-32). However, he does not
specify what he means by domain.
Tourangeau and Sternberg (1982) are a little more specific about the meaning of

domain: "Concepts--and the features, dimensions, and semantic relations that characterize
them--cluster into domains" (p.215). They "intend the notion of domains to be flexible"
(p. 215) because the domain of an object may be perceived differently by different
people. Furthermore, some objects may be seen as belonging to several domains, and
therefore "context can determine the relevant domains" (p. 215). Finally, if a metaphor
is uttered with minimal linguistic or contextual clues, we may infer the domain. In any
case, a metaphor is identified when a hearer recognizes that "two domains or systems of
thought are both active" (p. 217).
In their 'domains-interaction' view, the interaction involves the domains as well as
the tenor and the vehicle.
We suggest that metaphors generally involve seeing something (men) in
one domain in terms of something (wolves) in a second domain, with a
resulting change in our view of both domains. (p. 214)
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In The man is a wolf. we not only see man in terms of wolf; we also see certain human
behavior as analogous to animal behavior.
In both creating and comprehending a metaphor, we construct "correspondences"
(p. 218) or parallel "systems of beliefs" (p. 225) not only about the tenor and the vehicle,
but also about their domains. We "see one concept in terms of another by construing
features or dimensions" (p. 215) that are parallel, and through a selective 'mapping'
process, we carry them over from the tenor to the vehicle, from one domain to the other,
and vice versa. Consequently, there are two sources of similarity: "within-domains
similarity of tenor and vehicle ... [and] between-domains similarity" (p. 225). The domains
help specify what characteristics are important...[and] place limitations on
the manner by which features or dimensions applying within the domain of
the vehicle can be altered so as to fit the tenor. (pp. 216-217)
Their concept of 'within-domains similarity' is rather vague, but the important point is
that since the tenor and vehicle belong to different domains, much of the similarity is "at
best only analogous" (p. 218).
The concept of domains is an important contribution to understanding metaphor
although it is not entirely new.

Br~al

(1897/1964) uses domain to refer to an "order of

ideas" (p. 129):
A special kind of metaphor ... comes from the communication between our
organs of sense, which permit us to transport the sensations of sight into
the domain of hearing, or the ideas of touch into the domain of taste. (pp.
129-130)
It is similar to Shibles' 'universe of discourse' as well as other concepts: "field of
association" (Waldron 1967, p. 169); "different orders" (Empson 1964, p. 336);
"thoughts ... [or] contexts" (Richards 1936, p. 94); and "spheres of knowledge or
experience" (Miller 1979, p. 222), which is also cited by Stern (1932), although he
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rejects it as too vague, preferring "essential identity" (p. 299). All these concepts seem
to be suggesting that the duality of sense in metaphor encompasses more than the idea that
there are two dissimilar referents.

Lakoff and Johnson: Underlying Metaphors
The duality of sense is interpreted in a radically broad way by the use of source

domain and target domain in the theory of Lakoff and Johnson (Lakoff 1986, 1987a,
1987b; Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, 1980b; Johnson 1980, 1987). On the premise that
"experience is structured in a significant way prior to, and independent of, any concepts"
(Lakoff 1987b, p. 271), Lakoff and Johnson claim that all metaphors are "experiential"
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980b, p. 19). From our bodily experiences--movement, sensations,
orientational awareness, etc.--we form pre-conceptual image schemata to "give order and
connectedness to our perceptions and conceptions" (Johnson 1987). Examples include
"CONTAINERS, PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE ... UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK,
PART-WHOLE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc." (Lakoff 1987b, p. 267).
Using balance as an example, Johnson (1987) explains that metaphor involves
projections of image schemata.
The meaning of balance begins to emerge through our acts of balancing
and through our experience of systematic processes and states within our
bodies. (p. 75)
From this experience, we form image schemata, and then in using the word, balance,
"the metaphorical projections move from the bodily sense (with its emergent schema) to
the mental, epistemic, or logical domains" (p. 87). Consequently, we can perceive
sounds, colors, power, personalities, etc. as either balanced or unbalanced.
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According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980a), image schemata are distributed over
three domains of experience, "physical, cultural, and intellectual" (p. 461). Metaphor
draws from an image schema in one domain of experience and applies the concept to a
target domain (Lakoff 1987b). For example, the statement My income rose this year
entails the metaphor MORE IS UP, in which UP is in the (physical) source domain, and
MORE is in the (intellectual) target domain; the experience of UP is used to understand
the abstract concept of MORE (Lakoff and Johnson 1980b).
In most other theories of metaphor, My income rose probably would not be
regarded as metaphorical, but Lakoff and Johnson (1980a) claim that "the essence of
metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing or experience in terms of
another" (p. 455); "one concept is understood in terms of another" (Lakoff 1986, p. 224).
In general, we understand "the less clearly delineated in terms of the more clearly
delineated" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, p. 477); for example, we understand the abstract
in terms of the concrete.
They also claim that there are patterns of metaphors, and within these patterns
there is "systematicity" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, p. 456). For example, all the UP
metaphors are coherent, and all the DOWN metaphors are coherent:
HAPPY IS UP; SAD IS DOWN ...
CONCSIOUSNESS IS UP; UNCONSCIOUSNESS IS DOWN ...
HEALTH AND LIFE ARE UP; SICKNESS AND DEATH ARE
DOWN ...
MORE IS UP; LESS IS DOWN .. .
GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN .. .
VIRTUE IS UP; DEPRAVITY IS DOWN ...
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980b, pp. 15-17)
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However, they are looking at presumed "underlying metaphorical systems"
(Johnson 1987, p. 101). Consequently, they can claim there is such a metaphor as
ARGUMENT IS WAR pervading English spoken in the United States:
Your claims are indefensible.
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
His criticisms are right on target.
I demolished his argument.
I've never won an argument with him.
You disagree'! Okay, shoot!
If you use that strategy, he'll wipe you out.
He shot down all my arguments.
(Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, p. 454)
They also claim that "we don't just talk about arguments in terms of war ... we live by the
ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor in this country; it structures the actions we perform in
arguing" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980a, p. 455).
These are fascinating ideas, but their claims are challenged by counter-examples
that spring up at every turn. For example, we defend Masters theses and attack meals;
we can be on target in making a guess; we can demolish someone's faith; we can win
someone's love; and we can say, "You have any good ideas'! Okay, shoot!" Conversely,
we can criticize someone's argument with a variety of metaphors: it won't hold water; it
falls flat on its face; it is full of holes (or some scatalogical material); etc. As for
'systematicity', certainly many 'DOWN' expressions have negative connotations, but not
all, for at least down-to-eanh is good, and so is Our expenses were down this year.
Their premise that all metaphors have an experiential basis is also rather
precarious. Johnson (1987) claims that "we cannot begin to understand the various
meanings of balance without focusing on the preconceptual gestalt structures within our
network of meanings" (p. 74). If this is true, it may be after the fact, for balance derives
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from the Latin bilanx (bi-twice

+ lanx-flat plate,

scale); i.e., two-scaled or two-plated,

referring to a device for measuring the weight of one thing against that of another (OED).
Therefore, it is possible that at one time balance may have been used metaphorically with
reference to the body, as were chest (a box for valuables) and skull (a shell of an egg or
nut); the word balance may have been taken from another domain because the physical
experience of balance was 'nameless'. s Regardless of the metaphoric origin, the related
senses of balance are established through use, and it cannot be that every one of them is
entirely dependent on the physical experience of balance. The same could be said of any
other supposed underlying metaphor; otherwise, how could a metaphor such as
ARGUMENT IS WAR have meaning for someone who has not experienced war?
The larger question is whether all their examples are metaphors. Lakoff and
Johnson are focusing on a supposed psychological process, and when they try to explain
the linguistic phenomenon of metaphor in terms of this process, they make claims about
underlying metaphors that can be neither proved nor disproved. Perhaps one cause of
this problem is that "schema theory is so general that it readily lends itself to ad hoc
accounts of almost any phenomenon" (Ortony 1980b, p. 359). The Lakoff-Johnson view
is attractive because it confirms our intuition that many metaphors are systematically
related. We do use up-oriented metaphors to express happiness (floating; higher than a
kite; on cloud nine), and we use down-oriented metaphors to express sadness (sink to the
depths of despair; down in the dumps); if we can attack an argument, then we can also
shoot it fall of holes, blow it apan, etc. Such patterns of usage are worthy of study.

However, it does not necessarily follow that every expression with the sense of either up
or down in it is a metaphor. Despite the influence that it currently enjoys, the Lakoff-
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Johnson view of metaphor does little to help identify a metaphor, for it implies that an
underlying metaphor can be found in any expression.

Ortony: The Importance of Pragmatics
In a more balanced approach, Ortony (1975; 1979c; 1980a; 1980b) says that "it is
not linguistic expressions themselves that are metaphors, but particular uses of them"
(1980a, p. 73). Metaphor fulfills one or more of three communicative functions, which
Ortony (1975) explains in terms of "the compactness thesis, the inexpressibility thesis,
and the vividness thesis" (p. 45). Metaphor can express ideas or feelings that are
inexpressible in literal language. When literal expressions are too complex or verbose,
metaphor can provide a compact alternative by communicating large chunks of meaning in
a few words.

The 'vividness thesis' repeats Aristotle's point that metaphor is often able

to evoke images more vividly than literal language can, but Ortony adds the cognitive
assumption that "metaphor lies much closer to perceived experience" (p. 50). Metaphor
is "a means of conveying and acquiring new knowledge and of seeing things in new
ways" (1980b, p. 361). Depending on the insight derived, a metaphor may be a
comparison for someone who sees pre-existing similarity, and an interaction for someone
who discovers similarity through the metaphor (1980b).
According to Ortony (1980a), a necessary condition for identifying a metaphor is
pragmatic, or contextual, anomaly. This premise holds even for a semantically
anomalous sentence, such as The crowd floated up the counhouse steps (though Ortony
does not use this example), because "there can be no normal context in which it will fit
unless it is interpreted metaphorically" (1980a, p. 73). Contextual anomaly becomes both
necessary and sufficient when combined with two other conditions. First, expanding
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Grice's 'cooperative principle' to include a "sincerity postulate ... [and a] relevance
postulate" (1980a, p. 76), Ortony says that the speaker must both intend the expression to
be a metaphor and believe that the hearer will recognize this intention. The second
condition is that the hearer should be able to eliminate the tension created by the
contextual anomaly.
In eliminating the tension, the hearer ignores the "salient aspects or attributes
... that are perceived as being incompatible" (1980a, p. 78) between the topic and the
vehicle. For example, in The man is a wolf, these attributes of wolf would be ignored:
physical traits; specific behaviors of hunting, procreating, and raising young; types of
food eaten; etc. The process also involves "predicating of the topic only those
contextually salient features of the vehicle that are consistent with the topic" (1980b, p.
358). Depending on the context, these salient features of wolf would probably be
compatible with man: general behaviors of predation; killer instinct; voracity; rapacity;
dogged determination; etc. Of course, the hearer does not do this incrementally; rather,
"an entire cognitive substructure is mapped onto the topic" (p. 78).

Kittay's Perspectival Theory
Kittay's (1987) 'perspectival' theory also emphasizes context but argues that a
metaphor can be identified and understood independently of speaker intention because
"metaphorical use of language depends on systematic semantic features" (p. 46). For our
purposes, the most significant aspect of this theory is the proposition that metaphor
exhibits both "first-order and second-order meaning" (p. 41). This concept depends upon
two other related concepts: a 'relational' (as opposed to atomistic) theory of meaning,
and Kittay 's version of semantic field theory.
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In presenting a relational theory of meaning, Kittay contends that "the context of
an utterance is another utterance of greater complexity" (p. 78). In addition to the
explicit linguistic context, there is a non-linguistic context (e.g., the time and place of
utterance), which is also explicit because it could be "rendered linguistically as an
utterance of a complexity higher than that of the given expression" (p. 62). Every
utterance also has an implicit context, or "default frame" (p. 59), consisting of "default
assumptions" (p. 56) about physical reality, cultural values, discourse requirements,
common interests, shared experiences, dialects, etc. 6 Given this definition of context, all
meaning in natural language can be said to be context-dependent.
While a word does have meaning that is independent of both its default frame and
the time and place of utterance, the informative content of a word is specified by its
linguistic context. "All information is related to other information--it both includes and is
included in other information ... This is a relation of nesting" (p. 128). The nesting of
information establishes relations of affinity between words; relations of contrast are
established by alternate possibilities of information. "When words combine [in
discourse], their informative content is selectively pruned so that the resulting message is
coherent and appropriately informative" (p. 137). In other words, the specific meaning of
a word is partially determined by "the system in which it is embedded" (p. 123). One
system is its context of utterance, but even before it is used in that context, "a word's
meaning is partially determined by its position in a semantic field" (p. 34).
Kittay explains the concept of semantic fields in terms of content domains and

lexical sets.
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When a set of words , a lexical set, is applied to a domain unified by some
content, a content domain , we have a semantic field. The semantic fields
are comprised of terms which cover some specifiable conceptual ground
and which bear certain relations of affinity and contrast to one another.
(Kittay 1987' p. 33)
A content domain may be "any experiential , phenomenal, or conceptual domain" (p. 34),
and it is comparable to Lyon's (1977) 'conceptual field' ; e.g. , colors, shapes, cooking,
fishing, marriage, etc. "Content domains provide the conceptual substratum underlying
language, independent of any particular language" (p . 228) . Until a content domain is
articulated by a set of related lexical items , it has "unformed content" (p . 225).
Conversely, a content domain provides "the informative content of a term" (p. 225). The
set of lexical items that articulates a content domain is a semantic field .
Metaphor uses words in one semantic field (and its content domain) to refer to
something in another content domain. Since a semantic field articulates a content domain,
there must be two content domains and at least one semantic field. 7 This is the condition
when a semantic field is used to articulate an unformed content domain, such as a new
concept. For example, the phenomenon of electromagnetism is articulated metaphorically
by terms expressing fluidity: flow, current, waves, juice, etc .. Only one semantic field
is involved because there were no (satisfactory) terms referring to the movement of
electrons until fluidity terms were used . In a metaphor that articulates an unformed
content domain , there is a transference of the "relations which pertain within one semantic
field to a second, distinct content domain " (p . 36).
In other metaphors , there may be two semantic fields as well as two content
domains . For example, one interpretation of The man is a wolf would determine that the
content domain of the vehicle is ANIMALS , and the content domain of the topic is
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HUMANS; the semantic fields, respectively, are terms referring to animals and terms

referring to humans, and within these fields are terms referring to wolf behavior and
terms referring to human behavior. The transference of meaning is "a transference of
relations of contrast and affinity across semantic fields" (p. 138) as well as a transference
from one semantic field to another distinct content domain. Therefore, "metaphor
involves at least one semantic field and another distinct content domain, and often two
distinct semantic fields" (p. 291). Figure (1) illustrates Kittay's idea, incorporating the
terms source domain and target domain used by Lakoff and Johnson.
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Figure 1. Domains and semantic fields for The man is a wolf,
according to Kittay's theory.
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The chart also illustrates a corollary: a metaphor cannot consist of terms that
belong to the same semantic field. This explains why The dog is a wolf is not
metaphoric, for dog and wolf could easily be perceived as belonging to the same
content domain and as co-hyponyms in the same semantic ijeld. This also explains
why to shoulder responsibilities is metaphoric, but to shoulder a rifle is not. In
contrast to the semantic field for responsibility, the semantic field for rifle includes
words for actions that can be taken with rifles, one of which is to place it on the
shoulder. Furthermore, rifle has an affinity with other words for things that can be
shouldered, such as broom, which cannot be said of responsibility. Finally, this
requirement means that metonymy and synechdoche cannot be metaphors because
each is comprised of terms in the same semantic field. Other figures of speech could
be metaphors if their terms come from two distinct semantic fields; for example,
hyperbole is often metaphoric, as in I was eaten up with jealousy.
However, stipulating the involvement of two distinct semantic fields and two
distinct domains does not fully account for the duality of sense in a metaphor. It tells
us how the topic and the vehicle are different from each other, but it does not explain
how the metaphorical similarity is expressed. To this end, Kittay proposes that the
meaning of a metaphor is "second-order meaning, which is a function of first-order
meaning" (p. 24).
Consistent with advocating a relational theory of meaning, Kittay describes
linguistic meaning in terms of compositionality. Just as words, phrases, sentences,
texts, and discourse are "progressive combinations [that] produce increasing orders of
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grammatical complexity" (p. 51), the meanings within those constituents also
combine. When we comprehend discourse, we strive to specify meaning by selecting
among the possible interpretations those that seem to cohere with both contextual
factors and our default assumptions. When interpretations cohere, we have secured
"first order meaning, that is, the literal and conventional senses of an utterance"
(p. 24). 8

First-order meaning depends on two sets of semantic rules. One is "a set of

conditions and restrictions on the semantic combination of utterences ... known as
semantic combination rules, or sc-rules" (p. 53). The other is a set of "cohesive
projection rules" (p. 64) that govern "permissible linguistic combinations which are
both intra- and inter-sentential" (p. 61). Metaphor creates an incongruity between the
metaphorical utterance and its context by "bringing together ... semantic fields that are
kept distinct in first-order discourse" (p. 70). Therefore, metaphor breaks semantic
rules and yields second order meaning.
Kittay's idea that second-order meaning is a function of first-order meaning
adds some new insight to the duality of sense. In a metaphor, the speaker and the
hearer perceive both a first-order meaning and a second-order meaning. In The man

is a wolf, the first-order meaning of wolf is whatever we believe our speech
community accepts as the literal and conventional sense of the word. The secondorder meaning of wolf is that, within the context of utterance, we may be able to see
that the man is similar to a wolf, but in ways that are not exactly equivalent to the
literal and conventional sense of wolf because a wolf and a man belong to different
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domains. The wolf that is hypothetically similar to a man is an abstraction, the
features of which we can understand only if we have some first-order meaning of wolf
in mind. However, the first-order meaning will vary according to individual
knowledge and experience; e.g., one person may be an expert in the biology of
wolves, another may have only seen wolves pacing in a zoo, and the knowledge of
another may be limited to "Little Red Riding Hood" (which may be the source for the
conventional sense of the metaphor). Consequently, the second-order meaning of wolf
depends on, and varies with, whatever first-order meaning the speaker and the hearer
have in mind; second-order meaning is a function of first-order meaning.
Kittay says that second-order meaning is as much the product of a cognitive
activity as first-order meaning is, for metaphor also achieves reference. However,
whereas literal meaning can refer directly, metaphor is part of an "anaphoric chain"

(p. 303) in which one term from the domain of the topic has a literal referent;
"metaphorical reference is always achieved through anaphora--anaphoric antecedents
given in either the explicit or implicit context" (p. 310). For example, in the explicit
linguistic context for White's cathedral metaphor, cathedral refers to this holy spot,
which refers to a lake in Maine, which refers to the lake the author has in mind. In
addition, cathedral may be regarded as a PRO-form similar to pronouns and
reflexives, which replace other expressions that could refer to the antecedent, such as
the repetition of the antecedent itself.
Another reason second-order meaning is a product of a cognitive activity is
that seeing a man as a wolf (or a lake as a cathedral) involves a "perspectival
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shift. .. [i.e.,] a reordering of one content domain in accordance to the relations
governing another semantic field" (p. 302). Kittay's 'perspectival theory' is named
after the function of metaphor to provide a particular perspective in which both the
speaker and the hearer can comprehend the topic.
Metaphor provides the linguistic realization for the cognitive activity by
which a language speaker makes use of one linguistically articulated
domain to gain an understanding of another experiential or conceptual
[or phenomenal] domain. (p. 14)
Using Frege's distinction between sense and reference as an analogy, Kittay proposes
that the vehicle and the topic of a metaphor, like Frege's 'morning star' and 'evening
star,' are "two modes of presentation of the same object" (p. 30). This could be
interpreted to mean that the duality of sense in metaphor involves "two conceptual
contents which function as two simultaneous perspectives or categories in which some
entity is viewed" (p. 29). The cognitive effect is "epistemic access to the referent
through a different conceptual organization" (p. 313). Therefore, through the
metaphor The man is a wolf, we have a new perspective on a man, which is achieved
only because the metaphor expresses a second-order meaning of wolf that includes
reference to human behavior.
Kittay's theory may be the most balanced, thorough, and precise accounting of
metaphor currently available. However, there are some problems with her concept of
content domain. In the first place, Kittay is not consistent in using content domain
and semantic field; for example, she sometimes refers to fishing as a content domain
and sometimes as a semantic field. She also uses the term "two content planes" (p.
298). A more serious problem is that often it is difficult to pinpoint the content
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domains involved, especially if they must be conceptual substrata independent of any
language. In the cathedral metaphor, the possibilities for cathedral include
architecture, religious architecture, places of worship, religion, and the experience of
a cathedral; the possibilities for a lake in Maine include lakes, mountains, forests,
camping, fishing, canoeing, vacation, and the experience of a mountain lake. Finally,
as K.ittay points out, the concepts of content domains and semantic fields "cannot be
regarded as definitive ... [because] the work in semantic field theory is still
preliminary" (p. 247).
On the other hand, the concepts Kittay offers are more concrete than many
other ways of explaining metaphor. Even preliminary definitions of content domain
and semantic field can help identify a metaphor, for they explain why wolf can be
used as a metaphor for man but not for dog, etc. It may also be easier to explain the
duality of sense in terms of first-order/second-order meaning than by invoking more
nebulous ideas such as implicative complex, parallel systems of beliefs, projections of
image schemata, the mapping of a cognitive substructure, exchanges of meaning, or
even the transfer of meaning. Finally, tracing metaphorical reference through an
'anaphoric chain' may be a concrete way of explaining Aristotle's idea that one term
is 'put in place or another.

CONCLUSIONS

Perhaps the most striking feature of metaphor is its duality of sense. A
metaphor states or implies one thing and means something else, and yet the hearer (or
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reader) knows it is not a lie, an exaggeration, an ironic comment, a mistake
expressing mere ambiguity, or an indirect speech act. A metaphor states or implies
that two things (subjects, concepts, phenomena, experiences, actions, qualities, etc.)
are similar when in fact they are substantially different. The word or phrase used as
the vehicle for the meaning of the metaphor is given two referents; e.g., wolf refers
to both a wolf and a man in The man is a wolf. It is also given opposing senses: a
metaphorical wolf is a wolf and not a wolf; this wolf is something other than the
actual wolf. The topic acquires the same duality: the man is a wolf and not a wolf;
this man is a wolf only metaphorically. Consequently, the exact meaning of a
metaphor is complex, ambiguous, and unparaphrasable. Paradoxically, however, the
hearer has a fairly accurate idea of what the speaker means. This meaning depends
upon a tacit agreement between the speaker and the hearer to see similarity between
the two terms of the metaphor, all the while holding in mind the fact that they are
quite different from each other. It is this multi-faceted duality of sense that
distinguishes metaphor from any other kind of expression.
Faced with the task of trying to understand and explain the duality of sense,
the student of metaphor may be tempted to settle for the dictionary definition and
agree with Henle (1958):
There is little to be said on the subject of metaphor. It has been
discussed from ancient times to the present and on the whole there has
been a rough agreement. (p. 173).
The plethora of theories on metaphor currently available belie Henle's opinion.
However, they can lead to an equally dissatisfying antithesis:
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I suggest... that "Metaphors are black holes in the universe of
language": We know that they are there; many prominent people have
examined them; they have had enormous amounts of energy poured into
them; and, sadly, no one yet knows very much about them. (Fraser
1979, p. 184)
Even if a middle ground is maintained, anyone who has studied metaphor in depth
must agree with Tourangeau (1982): "To define the thing is one of the hardest
problems" (p. 15).
Th~

cause of this difficulty may be that puzzling over the duality of sense

turns the spotlight on the semantic aspects of metaphor, leaving its pragmatic aspects
in the shadows. Few students of metaphor would disagree with Ortony's (1979b)
assessment of metaphor as a matter of both semantics and pragmatics. However,
pragmatics is being overlooked when it is argued that there is a transfer of meaning
from one term to another, or that there are exchanges between the meanings of
words, or that systems of belief, cognitive substructures, or salient features are
reciprocally 'mapped' from one term to the other.
Metaphor is, essentially, a matter of pragmatics. It is a way of using
language to achieve particular communicative goals. The meaning of a metaphor
depends not only on the context of utterance, but also on a "reflexivity of belief and
intention" (Green 1989, p. 13) between speaker and hearer (or writer and reader). If
I say, The man is a wolf, I do so with the belief that you will believe I am neither
lying nor speaking irrelevant nonsense. My intention is to make some kind of
comparison, and I believe that you will be able to infer my intention as well as the
comparison. This belief is based partly on the fact that I will have made the
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statement in a context that not only tells you which particular man is my referent, but
also should contain enough information about the man's personality and behavior to
suggest in what ways I want you to see him as similar to a wolf. But I also believe
that you will believe that I do not mean the man is identical to, or even actually
similar to, a wolf. In fact, in order for my intended metaphorical comparison to be
communicated, it is crucial that neither of us believe that my referent is in any literal
way like a wolf.
This is what Grice (1975) means by saying that metaphor is a flouting of the
maxim to be truthful. The obvious falsity compels my audience to draw implications,
or as Grice calls them, "conversational implicatures" (p. 45), about my statement.
Similarly, Black (1979a) says there are "unstated implications: Their producers need
the receiver's cooperation in perceiving what lies behind the words used" (p. 27). In
producing The man is a wolf, I must believe that you will be able to draw inferences
from everything you know, and everything you believe I know, about this particular
man as well as about certain human behavior, wolves, and wolf behavior. In order
for you to make the comparison that I intend, both of us must tacitly accept "the
pretense that something is the case when it is not" {Turbayne 1962, p. 13).
However, metaphor is not solely a matter of pragmatics.
The semantics will ... provide a characterization of the literal meaning or
conventional content of the expressions involved, and from this,
together with details of the context, the pragmatics will have to provide
the metaphorical interpretation ... [This is because] the full meaning of
most of the sentences we utter is best captured by a technical division
of labor between a semantic component and a pragmatic one. (Levinson
1983, p. 156)
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Second, a word used metaphorically is not only given two different referents; it is
also temporarily given an additional sense.

Furthermore, semantics is apparent in

the way metaphor conforms to the accepted premise that "the semantics [of any
utterance] is COMPOSIDONAL and basically TRUTH-CONDIDONAL" (Green
1989, p. 6). Even though a metaphor states or implies something that is false, it can
be regarded as truth-conditional because the agreed-upon pretense gives metaphor an

"as if or make believe feature" (Turbayne 1962, p. 17), which establishes conditions
under which the metaphoric utterance could be considered true. According to Miller
(1979), the audience assumes that "what the author said is true in the state of affairs
he is describing" (p. 214); the context of a metaphor is a "semantic model" (p. 206)
in which the truth conditions may be found.
"To say that the semantics is compositional means that. .. the meaning of the
whole is a function of the meanings of the parts" (Green 1989, p. 6); that is to say,
the meaning of the whole depends on, and varies with, the meanings of the parts. If
we remove a metaphor such as The man is a wolf from its context, we cannot
interpret it accurately; we cannot derive the intended metaphorical meaning from the
meanings of its component words. However, in a sense, the meaning of the metaphor
is still compositional because it is "dependent on a prior use of words which is
conventional and arbitrary" (Waldron 1967, p. 18). In other words, we know what

wolf means conventionally, and therefore, in the metaphor it must mean something
else. Furthermore, the context of the metaphor radically alters the conventional
meanings of these words, and the metaphorical meaning varies accordingly. The
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compositionality of metaphor is more precisely explained by Kittay's (1987)
proposition that metaphorical meaning is second-order meaning, which is a function of
first-order meaning; therefore, the only way to understand how a man can be
metaphorically similar to a wolf is to have some first-order meaning of wolf in mind.
In fact, Kittay claims that the distinction between first-order and second-order
meaning "cuts across the semantic-pragmatic divide" (p. 42).
One advantage of a traditional approach is that it keeps our attention on
metaphor as a particular use of language. Cognitive theorists may be correct in
saying that metaphor is the linguistic realization of 'metaphorical thought'. Perhaps
metaphor is a way of understanding one experience or concept in terms of another.
However, for pedagogical purposes, it would be counter-productive to try to explain
the supposed mental processes involved in 'metaphorical thought'. In contrast, we
can explain in detail how a metaphor substitutes one word or phrase for another.
Even if paraphrases are inadequate for expressing every nuance of meaning that a
native speaker of English comprehends upon hearing a metaphor, we can explain in
detail how a metaphor makes a comparison of two dissimilar subjects. It should also
be easy for the student to recognize the two referents of a metaphor as well as the fact
that each one includes a set of connotations that are partly dependent on context.
Finally, an explanation of how metaphor expresses the comparison can be presented
in concrete terms, such as Turbayne's 'as-if feature of metaphor.
On the other hand, cognitive views offer at least three useful perspectives.
First, they stress that the pervasiveness of metaphors in everyday speech is
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significant; metaphor is not just an artistic or poetic way of using language. Second,
they give strong arguments against the vague idea that there is a transfer of meaning
from the word used metaphorically to the word representing the topic of the
metaphor. Rather, they rightly emphasize that the duality of sense involves not just
two words or phrases, but two systems of thought or concepts. Third, this emphasis
requires that the meaning of a metaphor be understood in terms of the different
domains to which the words and concepts belong.
Since Aristotle's use of the phrase similarity in dissimilars to characterize
metaphorical meaning, two general claims about metaphor have evolved. Within the
traditional framework, metaphor is a way of speaking about two different things as if
they were one; "it gives you two ideas as one" (Turbayne 1962, p. 17). Cognitive
theorists tend to follow Black's (1979b) claim that "one thing is thought of (or
viewed) as another thing" (p. 192).
These concepts really are not that far apart, and there is an interpretation that
can integrate them. When we create a metaphor, we use a word that conventionally
(or literally) refers to something in one conceptual, phenomenal, or experiential
domain to refer to something in a different domain; i.e., the word used
metaphorically is temporarily given two different referents. It is also temporarily
given an additional sense. This additional sense could be regarded as a second-order
meaning, in contrast to the first-order meaning, which is the literal and conventional
sense of the word used metaphorically. The second-order meaning is a function of
the first-order meaning because it depends on, and varies with, whatever first-order

77

meaning the speaker and the hearer have in mind. This is possible only because both
the speaker and the hearer tacitly agree to an 'as-if' condition; that is, both are aware
that the two referents are distinctly different, but accept the pretense that they may be
seen as if they were similar. Metaphor, then, is a way of using language to
communicate the perception that two substantially different things may be seen as
they were similar, and this metaphorical comparison depends crucially on an

awareness that they are not in fact similar.

if
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NOTES

1

Probably any expression could be used metaphorically, given the appropriate

context. For example, She shouldered her rifle could refer to a lawyer filling her
briefcase with notes to be used in taking aim at her courtroom opponent. The point
here is that She shouldered her rifle is an example of conversion, while She
shouldered her responsibilities can only be metaphoric.
2

3

Grice's ideas will be discussed in a little more detail in Chapter III.
Black's 1962 view is the one that most theorists respond to because his 1979

version has not been as widely disseminated. The older view is closer to Richards',
but Black uses "principle subject" for the tenor and "subsidiary subject" for the
vehicle; the ground is a "system of associated commonplaces."

His 1979 view

revises his earlier claim that the system of associated commonplaces transfers or
projects a set of predicates pertaining to the subsidiary subject onto the principle
subject. His later view also abandons the idea that a metaphor is a "filter" through
which the principle subject is viewed; i.e., the idea that metaphor filters out nonsalient features of both subjects.
4

Black wants to say that these two sets of implications are isomorphic to each

other, but he admits that there is a '"mixed lot' of projective relations" (p. 31). In
my example, C2 and L2 are not exactly isomorphic.
5

It would be insightful to find out what term was used in England prior to the

adoption of the French balance, but my efforts thus far have been fruitless.
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According to the OED, the Old English wage referred to a pair of scales as well as
its function; these senses were extended both literally and figuratively. However,
apparently wage was not used to refer to the bodily experience of balance.
Presumably Old English and/or Anglo-Saxon may have had. a term similar to the
German die Selbstbeherrschung (self-control) or das Gleichgewicht (yielding to an
equal [weight]). Also, as in German, there may have been different terms to refer to
the various activities and conditions currently covered in English by balance.
6

It might be argued that the default frame could be articulated, just as the non-

linguistic context can be articulated. If so, there is no reason to distinguish between
implicit and explicit contexts. However, the distinction is valuable because the
pragmatic aspects of language require that there be non-linguistic or extra-linguistic
contexts.
7

That there must be two content domains is something I have had to deduce

because Kittay is unclear on this point. On page 289, she raises the question of
whether it is a necessity, but never states a conclusion.
8

Kittay stresses literal and conventional because some "idioms and very

conventionalized metaphors, for example, 'Hold your tongue'" (p. 51), have a
conventional meaning that is different from its literal meaning. There are two
problems with this argument. First, Kittay is assuming "hold your tongue"
metaphorically extends the literal meaning of hold, 'to take and keep with the hands
or arms'. However, this meaning derived from the generalization of a literal meaning
established at least since 1000 AD: 'to keep, possess, contain, detain (etc.) anything'.
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Second, if "hold your tongue" means 'do not speak', and if that is its only meaning,
then that must be its literal and conventional sense. These two issues will be
discussed further in Chapter III.

CHAPTER III

DEAD METAPHORS AND METAPHORIC EXTENSION

And the bottom line is this: Iraq's reign of terror has ended. (President
Bush, News Conference, March 2, 1991)
They are expressing the bottom-line feelings about the Japanese
dominance in the consumer electronics market. (Dan Rather, CBS
News, Feb. 17, 1989)
But when it came to the bottom line of points allowed, the Giants were
the first (211) and the 49er's second. (Oregonian, Jan. 20, 1991, p.
E9)
OK. That's it. That's my bottom line. That's my last offer ... Wait a
minute ... There are bottom lines and there are bottom lines. (Murphy
Brown, TV sitcom series, Nov. 5, 1990)

Anyone with experience in business knows bottom line refers to the last line
on a profit-and-loss statement. Therefore, these examples must be metaphors. A
term normally used in the domain of business is being used to refer to something in
other domains, even the domain of emotions, to say that one thing may be seen as if
it were similar to the conclusion of a balance sheet. But are they metaphors? In
these examples, bottom line is synonymous with other phrases: (a) final word; (b)
basic; (c) most significant factor; and (d) last offer.
Many speakers are using bottom line without consciousness of using an
accounting term metaphorically. A prime example comes from a high school
activities coordinator: "The bottom line is he wanted us to give him your phone
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number so that he could try to talk you into selling your skis directly to him." When
asked what she meant by bottom line, she replied, "'Bottom line' is 'last resort', I
guess" (personal communication). Another example is pierced with irony: "But the
issue is, is money the bottom line? We also have to think of morality" (Caller on a
radio talk show, KXL AM, Portland, Oregon, Sept. 18, 1991). In the past decade,
this expression has saturated everyday speech to the extent that, to some sensitive
ears, it has become an unpleasant cliche. Indeed, there are bottom lines, and there
are bottom lines.
It seems that the accounting term is becoming broader and more general. The

bottom line is the result after everything that can be added in is added in, and
everything that can be taken out is taken out. What was once a metaphor is no longer
a metaphor, or perhaps it is a metaphor only to those with business experience. On
the other hand, people in business are also using it to express this conventional sense
rather than as a metaphor.
In observing the various uses of bottom line, we are witnessing the
transformation of a novel metaphor to what is commonly known as a dead metaphor.
Although this change may seem to be haphazard, it is actually following a systematic
process of metaphoric extension. When semantic change results from this process, as
seems to be the case with bottom line, it is systematically related to other forms of
semantic change. However, the main objective of this chapter is not to develop an
argument about the role of metaphor in semantic change, but to describe metaphoric
extension in a way that will facilitate the selection and organization of a vocabulary
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based on this process. The first question to address (and the main problem) is this:
How can we regard these metaphors as 'dead' if we continue to use them?

FROM NOVEL TO DEAD

The Dilemma of 'Dead Metaphor'
When a metaphor becomes established as a conventional expression, it may
seem to be something less than it once was. "The metaphor may fade, so that it loses
its metaphorical force" (Stern 1931, p. 309); it becomes "etoliated" (Black 1979a, p.
27) or "degenerate" (Tourangeau and Sternberg 1980, p. 208). The common
pejorative is 'dead metaphor'. But if it is dead, why call it any kind of metaphor at
all? The reason, apparently, is that the typical dead metaphor, "the leg of a table for
example ... comes to life very readily" (Richards 1936, p. 117). If that is the case,
then why call it 'dead'?
This dilemma has prompted some theorists to propose alternatives to the term

dead: "lexicalized" (Blank 1988, p. 21); "conventional" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980a,
p. 453); "historical" (Lakoff 1987a, p. 147); "established" (Cooper 1986, p. 130);
"stored" (Morgan 1979, p. 141); "hidden" (Turbayne (1962, p. 25); and "stock"
(Empson 1964, p. 335).

"Many words occupy a position between living and dead

metaphors ... [which are] sometimes called sleeping or faded metaphors" (Waldron
1967, p. 178); Leech (1974) calls these "moribund" (p. 213). Fraser (1979) suggests
dead metaphors could be plotted on a continuum between 'alive' and 'dead', and
Black (1979a) suggests "appropriate labels might be 'extinct', 'dormant', and 'active'"
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(p. 26). However, merely changing labels does not lead us out of the dilemma. We

need to know how a novel metaphor becomes established in the lexicon as a dead
metaphor.
The problem, once again, is a confounding of the semantic and pragmatic
aspects of metaphor. The spotlight is kept on semantics by the assumption that a
metaphor dies, fades, or diminishes in some way. The duality of sense is no longer
prominent; a dead metaphor has "lost its tension of parts" (Hester 1967, p. 18). The
speaker does not seem to be saying that two different things may be seen as
metaphorically similar; rather, the sense being communicated seems to be literal.
Consequently, the use of dead metaphor also highlights the semantic change that may
have taken place; e.g., leg, once referring only to an anatomical organ, now also
refers to a component of a table, a chair, a bench, etc. However, since a metaphor is
a metaphor only because a word or phrase is used in a particular way, pragmatic
forces must be involved in the transformation from a novel metaphor to a 'dead' one.
The following discussion proposes that the process of metaphoric extension is
driven primarily by pragmatics. The meaning of an expression is extended
metaphorically when it is used to refer to something in a distinctly different
phenomenal, conceptual, or experiential domain. This extension temporarily gives the
word or phrase an additional sense, but if this additional sense continues to serve
communicative goals, it can become either a conventional sense or a literal and
conventional sense. Therefore, the way out of the dilemma imposed by the value-
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laden metaphor, dead metaphor, is to recognize that the metaphorical sense survives
in a dead metaphor; if anything 'dies', it is the use of the expression as a metaphor.

Awareness and the 'Death' of a Metaphor
It is generally assumed that dead metaphors "are based on a conjunction of

opposites which have occurred so often that the individual has become unaware of the
opposites involved" (Apter 1982, p. 64). This view has little explanatory value
because it says a novel metaphor becomes a dead metaphor by accident; our minds
are simply stupefied by repetitive exposure to a metaphor. It does not explain why
we intentionally use a word or phrase to express a metaphorical comparison, and then
later (apparently unintentionally, according to this view) use it to express a literal or
conventional meaning.
At first glance, an emphasis on speaker/hearer awareness may seem to be a
more accurate way of characterizing these metaphors than to label them as 'dead',
'moribund', 'sleeping', etc. Speakers and hearers may be more or less aware that an
expression is (or once was) a metaphor, and therefore, we could imagine a continuum
of awareness rather than a dead-alive continuum. By focusing on awareness, we
avoid the issue of whether leg of a table, for example, is more dead that swamped

with work, or that the latter is more easily resurrected than the former. Many
speakers are probably aware that swamped with work is a metaphor that has become a
conventional way of saying one has too much work to do. In contrast, in normal
conversation, hardly anyone is aware of the metaphoric origin of leg of a table.
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With expressions such as leg of a table, it is easy to imagine that for a time
speakers were aware of the metaphor and through repetition of use lost that
awareness. But consider some computer-related metaphors: shell, menu, memory,

mother board, virus, clone, and mouse. As with leg of a table, these terms express
literal meaning because they are the only names of specific components, processes, or
conditions. However, speakers in the computer field are aware that they are using
recently-introduced metaphors. This awareness is especially evident in the fact that
the electrical cord attached to the mouse is humorously referred to as the tail. These
metaphors reveal that it is possible to be fully aware of a metaphor and
simultaneously regard it as expressing literal meaning.
Therefore, identifying degrees of awareness is no more useful than calculating
some condition between alive and dead. Either approach only recognizes knowledge
of the fact (or probability) that an expression at one time was a novel metaphor.
Another approach is needed.

An Alternative: First-order/Second-order Meaning
Kittay's (1987) concept of first-order/second-order meaning contributes to one
possible explanation of how a novel metaphor becomes a dead metaphor. Metaphor
expresses both first-order and second-order meaning. First-order meaning is the
literal and conventional sense of an expression. A novel metaphor temporarily creates
a new, second-order meaning, which is a function of the first-order meaning. In
some metaphors, that second-order meaning becomes established as a literal and
conventional sense; i.e., a new first-order meaning.
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For example, clue currently refers to a fact, an idea, or an object that can help
solve a problem or mystery. As early as the 9th C., clue (or clew) referred to "A
globular body; a ball (formed by coiling together or conglomeration) ... A round bunch
or cluster of things" (OED). One type of clue was a ball of yarn or thread, which
(according to the OED) was used to guide someone into and back out of a labyrinth,
though this may have occurred only in the legend of Theseus. Consequently, clue
was used metaphorically to refer to something that helped solve a problem or
mystery; that is, as if similar to a thread guiding someone out of a labyrinth. For
most speakers, the sense of clue as a ball of yarn or thread (the first-order meaning)
ceased to be used, and the metaphorical (second-order) meaning became the literal
and conventional sense of clue. 1 The second-order meaning is no longer a function of
the first-order meaning; we do not think, 'as if similar to a ball of thread guiding
someone out of a labyrinth'. Rather, the word has acquired "as a first order meaning
the sense which previously only contributed to its second-order meaning" (Kittay
1987, p. 142).

In reference to a table (chair, bench, etc.), leg has undergone the same kind of
change except that its original first-order meaning continues to be used. The original
first-order meaning of leg names the anatomical organ to which it refers. At one
time, presumably, a second-order meaning was created by using leg metaphorically to
refer to part of a table, which served as the only name for that object. The second
order meaning in the metaphor has become a literal and conventional sense of leg,
and therefore, another first-order meaning; it is no longer a function of the original
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first-order meaning. Since the original first-order meaning still exists, it is easy to
recognize that former duality of first-order/second-order meaning, and when we do, it
may seem that the metaphor 'comes to life'.
However, we are almost never conscious of the anatomical leg in leg of a

table, and most speakers of English are oblivious to the original literal meaning of

clue. Even if we are aware of a metaphoric origin, as is possible in swamped with
work, we do not think of either of the two possible sources of the metaphor: (a) the
actual conditions in a swamp or (b) a boat filling with water and sinking. In other
words, it is the original first-order meaning, not the second-order meaning, that
diminishes or becomes 'hidden' in a dead metaphor.
How does this happen? Is it an accident that occurs over time? Is it the result
of random influences, along the lines of genetic mutation? Does a metaphor really
become worn-out or sickly, or fall asleep, or die because we use it too much?
A feasible solution appears in Kittay's (1987) version of the assumption that
we lose awareness of a metaphor:
No matter how 'dead' or conventionalized, metaphors are metaphors
none the less. Consider the ease with which their metaphorical origins
may be called forth. Few metaphors seem as dead and worn-out to us
as 'leg of a table' ... The conventional metaphor may, then, be viewed
as falling within first-order analysis when its dormant double semantic
import is either fully forgotten by the generally competent speaker (a
genuinely dead metaphor) or for practical linguistic purposes safely
disregarded. (p. 89, italics added)
In the claim that dead metaphors 'are metaphors nonetheless', Kittay seems to be
lapsing into the common tendency to overlook the fact that an expression is a
metaphor only because we use it as such. Consequently, she is undermining her
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bridge between the semantics and pragmatics of metaphor. Following her own
agrument, if a metaphor expresses both first-order and second-order meaning, the
latter being a function of the former, then a word or phrase expressing only firstorder meaning is not a metaphor. In normal usage, leg of a table expresses only
first-order meaning; this particular sense of leg is not a function of the sense referring
to the anatomical organ. We can recognize the (probable) metaphoric origin for leg
of a table because the original first-order meaning is still in use, but it is not normally
used metaphorically with reference to a table. It is no longer a metaphor. If it were,
then we would have to say that a word such as complicated is used as a metaphor
because its Latin root means 'folded together'. Rather than say these expressions are
'metaphors nonetheless', it may be more accurate to regard them as former
metaphors, or expressions that at one time had been used as metaphors.

However,

Kittay has brought out two ideas worth pursuing.
First, we should distinguish between 'genuinely dead' metaphors and those that
express a more conventional sense, such as swamped with work. For the sake of
argument, I will reserve the term dead for former metaphors that now express literal
and conventional meaning; e.g., leg (of a table), clue and complicated. In normal
conversation, the new first-order meaning of a dead metaphor is no longer a function
of a prior first-order meaning even if we are aware of its metaphoric origin.
Therefore, we would have to say that even the computer mouse, which is so
obviously metaphorically-derived, must be a dead metaphor. It may seem that this
use of mouse cannot be regarded as a truly dead metaphor because the word also
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refers to the well-known rodent; hence the comical 'tail'. However, this only
indicates a metaphoric origin. Its meaning has to be literal because it is the only
name for the computer object to which it refers, and speakers do not need to think of
the living mouse in order to communicate. Those metaphors that we may still
intentionally use and/or construe as metaphors regardless of how conventional their
meaning need another designation. For the sake of argument, I will adopt Empson's
(1964) term, 'stock metaphor', because it is simple and captures the idea that they
have become established as part of our lexical inventory.
The second useful idea in Kittay's statement is that when we are still aware of
the 'double semantic import' in a dead metaphor, we disregard it 'for practical
linguistic purposes'. Kittay does not develop this idea, but it provides a feasible
solution to the problem of how a novel metaphor becomes a dead metaphor. It also
helps explain how some dead metaphors seem to 'come to life'. Finally, it keeps the
bridge between semantics and pragmatics intact.
I would like to propose that a novel metaphor becomes a dead metaphor
because we disregard the first-order meaning for pragmatic reasons; essentially, to
exploit the communicative efficacy of the second-order meaning. In a novel
metaphor, the speaker and the hearer tacitly agree to accept the 'as-ir quality; they
are equally aware of the presence of both first-order and second-order meaning. If
the second-order meaning (e.g., 'basic issue' for bottom line) becomes
communicatively more significant, the speaker and hearer disregard the first-order
meaning ('net profit or loss'), which establishes that second-order meaning as a
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conventional sense. In some cases, it becomes established as a new literal fill..d
conventional sense, or first-order meaning, as it has in clue, leg, and the computer

mouse. However, this does not necessarily mean that we disregard the fact that the
expression is (or was) a metaphor. We may retain that aw3:feness, and when we do,
it neither contributes to nor detracts from the process of metaphoric extension because

the important factor is the extent to which we disregard the original first-order
meaning.
The current use of the computer terms shows that process in action. The
speakers using these terms are creating metaphors, accepting them as conventional
ways of speaking, and at the same time, they are establishing literal senses for those
words in that context. More important, however, the speakers are aware of the
metaphors, but disregard the original first-order meaning in order to achieve
communication with the second-order meaning. This phenomenon suggests that the
literal senses of terms such as leg of a table and electric current were established in
the same way, and did not necessarily require either the passage of time or
overexposure to the metaphors.
Therefore, perhaps we can characterize stock metaphors on a continuum of
conventional and literal sense:

STOCK METAPHORS

<
literal and
conventional

>
conventional
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We push a stock metaphor closer to 'literal-conventional' the more we disregard the
first-order meaning. The less first-order meaning is disregarded, the greater is the
possibility that it can be identified, construed, or intended as a metaphor. The
majority of stock metaphors will drift back and forth along the continuum, influenced
by a wide range of variables, such as context of utterance, verbal signals, and
speaker/hearer background (experience, education, cultural values, dialect, etc.). It is
not a matter of whether an expression is more or less metaphorical; i.e., more or less
'alive' as a metaphor. Rather, it is a matter of whether the speaker intends and/or the
hearer construes the expression as a metaphor, and this depends upon the degree to
which they either attend to or disregard the original first-order meaning.
In other words, it is a matter of pragmatics because it involves not only
contextual factors, speaker/hearer background, etc., but also the reflexivity of
intention and belief. When we disregard the first-order meaning, we intend to let the
second-order meaning express a relatively literal or conventional sense. Furthermore,
we believe that our audience will recognize that intention and not believe we are using
an expression metaphorically. Even though we know our audience may be aware (as
we are) that the expression was used metaphorically at one time and may still be
construed as a metaphor, we believe that our audience will believe that
communication of intended meaning will be facilitated more by construing the
expression as literal (or conventional) rather than metaphorical. Consequently, the
tacit, agreed-upon pretense of a metaphor becomes a tacit agreement to disregard the
first-order meaning in favor of the second-order meaning.
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When the original first-order meaning has ceased to be used, as with clue, it is
impossible not to disregard it. It is a dead metaphor and outside the continuum. Of
course, it would be possible to pay attention to the original first-order meaning if
someone discovers its etymological connection with the new first-order meaning.
However, this would only contribute to an awareness of two senses, one of which is
obsolete.
If a second-order meaning has been established as an additional first-order

meaning, the original first-order meaning is necessarily disregarded; e.g., leg of a
table; head of a compay; and face a problem. In these expressions, it is possible to
pay attention to the original first-order meaning, but there is no need to do so because
it would not facilitate communication. For example, to understand head of a

company, there is no need to perceive a person occupying that position as
metaphorically similar to the uppermost organ on the human body. In fact, there is a
greater need to disregard the comparison because the sense of head of a company I

family/class/group; etc. has already been established as a literal and conventional
sense. It is the most efficient way of communicating the idea, and therefore, not
disregarding the original first-order meaning may interfere with or at least complicate
communication. 2
In many collocations, such as forge a plan and.flow of traffic, there is no
need to disregard first-order meaning, but we habitually do so. The same is true of
idioms such as Cut me some slack, on thejl.ip side and a can ofwonns. A strong bit
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of evidence is the often-heard It sounds fishy instead of It smells fishy, for if we were
attending to the first-order meaning, we would not use the verb sound.
On the other hand, with many of these kinds of expressions, communication
may be facilitated by attending to the duality of sense if it makes the statement more
vivid. This may be one reason that many metaphors are 'stock' rather than 'dead'.
There may be a pragmatic need to be able to disregard the first-order meaning to a
greater or lesser degree according to the goals of the communication.
The exact first-order meaning of some stock metaphors may be either unknown
or incorrectly identified. For example, benchmark can easily be interpreted as
referring to a mark on a bench that a tailor or some other craftsman might use for
measuring; in fact, it is a surveying term (OED). Similarly, folk etymology has
spread the rumor that kick the bucket is derived from a method of hanging someone
by having the victim kick a supporting bucket. According to the OED, bucket
originally referred to the beam on which a pig was suspended by its hind legs for
slaughtering; when its throat was slit, it kicked the bucket. In cases such as these, the
significant factor is that there is (or was) a distinct first-order meaning, and it is this
fact that is either attended to or disregarded. To know the exact original first-order
meaning is unnecessary.

Patterns of Metaphoric Extension
In order to illustrate how the second-order meaning of a metaphor becomes
established as a new first-order meaning, the literal-conventional continuum needs to
be expanded. Figure (2) shows a basic pattern that can be used for this purpose.
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(l) FIRST-ORDER MEANING
(2) NOVEL METAPHOR
( 3) FIRST-ORDER II SECOND-ORDER
(7) SECOND-ORDER
fipe£ epeep

(4) SECOND-ORDER
FIRST-ORDER

(6) SECOND-ORDER

£lrsf4order
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(5) SECOND-ORDER
first-order

(8) STOCK METAPHOR

literal and
conventional

conventional

(9) NEW FIRST-ORDF.R MF.ANTNG I
(10) DEAD METAPHOR

Figure 2. Basic pattern of metaphoric extension when new first-order
meaning is established.
The reason for calling a literal and conventional sense 'first-order meaning' (1) is to
distinguish it from the meaning that the metaphorical use of a word or phrase
expresses. In a novel metaphor (2), both first-order and second-order meaning are
perceived; they are parallel (3), with neither one attended to more than the other. If
this usage continues to be an effective way of communicating intended meaning, there
is an increasing pragmatic need to disregard the first-order meaning. As we
increasingly disregard the first-order meaning (4-7), it becomes less prominent and is
eventually almost obscured by the second-order meaning. There is always the
possibility that the speaker and/or the hearer may be prompted to attend to the duality
of first-order/second-order meaning; the second-order meaning may still be regarded

96
as a function of the first-order meaning to some degree. Therefore, the continuum
under STOCK METAPHOR (8) is represented by a double arrow. However, if a
new first-order meaning is established (9), the second-order meaning is no longer a
function of the first-order meaning, and the first-order meaning is necessarily
disregarded. We could call this new sense a 'dead metaphor' (10) in order to
distinguish it from a stock metaphor. (Subsequent diagrams omit 'dead metaphor' in
the interest of space.)
Figure (3) illustrates the preceding analyses of clue and leg. For both words,
the new first-order meaning (F-0.2) is a new sense. The main difference between
them is that the original first-order meaning (F-0.1) of clue has become obsolete (at
least for most speakers), while the original first-order meaning of leg has survived. 3
It also illustrates that the original first-order meaning can generate other novel

metaphors, which can become established first as stock metaphors and then as dead
metaphors expressing a new sense of the word. However, as indicated by the
question marks under leg of a journey, it is not always clear whether a new sense has
been established or whether the expression is normally used as a stock metaphor.
Figure (4) shows how different metaphors can be derived from different
features of a word's meaning (here, F.1 and F.2).4 Originally aftermath referred to
the second mowing of grass or hay, which implies an additional benefit (F.1).
However, the second mowing is never as good as the first (F.2); as quoted in the
OED, "No aftermath has the fragrance and the sweetness of the first crop."

Consequently, the OED cites two kinds of metaphors: (1) "I am one that hath lived
long and gathered in Life's aftermath"; (2) "Rash Lover, speak what Pleasure hath
Thy Spring in such and Aftermath!" In most dialects, aftermath no longer refers to
an agricultural event, and its current literal and conventional meaning derives from
F.2: "a result or consequence, esp. an unpleasant one" (Webster's 1984).
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Example: clue
F-0.l:

ball of yarn
or thread
obsolete

NOVEL METAPHOR:

fact, idea, or object that helps solve
a problem or mystery, as· if it were
similar to a thread guiding someone out
of a labyrinth

FIRST-ORDER II SECOND-ORDER

SECOND-ORDER
fiFBt. 9FBel!'

SECOND-ORDER
FIRST-ORDER

SECOND-ORDER

SECOND-ORDER
first-order

:£::trs£:+6rder
::.:•'.•'.•'.•'.

:::•'.•'.•'.•'.•'.;'.·'.·'.·'.·:·::·:.:·;-;.;::·:·:::::::::::

STOCK METAPHOR
DEAD METAPHOR
F-0.2: fact, idea, or object that helps
solve a problem or mystery

new sense
~

Example: leg
F-0.l:

anatomical organ

NOVEL METAPHOR:
leg of a table, etc.

NOVEL METAPHOR:
leg of a journey

s-o

F-olls-o

s-o

F-olls-o

F-0

s-o
.£-a

s-o

!ms

F-0

s-o

s-o

s-o

s-o

f-o

.£-a

'f¥6

f-o

STOCK METAPHOR

STOCK METAPHOR

DEAD METAPHOR

DEAD METAPHOR ?

F-0.2

F-0.3 ?

new sense
~

new sense ?

I!=:========!.!================~?

Figure 3. Original first-order meaning (F-0.1) either continues or is
replaced by new first-order meaning (F-0.2).
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Example: aftermath

F-0.l: second mowing
l'===r==========~==============='?>!,J obsolete
FEATURES
F.1: added benefit
NOVEL METAPHORS; e.g.,
I am one that hath lived
long and gathered in
Y Life's aftermath.

F.2: never as good I
as the first

NOVEL METAPHORS; e.g.,
Rash lover, speak what
Pleasure hath Thy Spring
in such an Aftermath!

\l1

STOCK METAPHOR?

Not established as a new sense.

STOCK METAPHOR

F-0.2: a result or consequence,
esp. an unpleasant one

new sense
~

Figure 4. Different features of meaning lead to different metaphors.
The pattern illustrated in Figure (5) reveals two other characteristics of
metaphoric extension. First, once a new sense is established, it can be used
metaphorically, which in tum can lead to another stock metaphor and, possibly,
another new sense. Second, conversion of a noun to a verb is often involved. This is
apparent in so many other stock or dead metaphors, as the examples in Chapter I
reveal. The example here is browse, which is commonly used (in the U.S.) as a verb
meaning 'to examine anything casually, particularly articles for sale'. Figure (5)
shows how this sense derives from the noun browse, which in the 16th C. referred to
young shoots and twigs of shrubs, trees, etc. Two features of this meaning can be
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identified. The first (F.l) is that browse was eaten by goats and cattle in the field,
and by deer in the wild. Consequently (F.1.a), browse was gathered by farmers as
fodder for livestock: "If thou have any trees to croppe for the fyre-wodde, croppe
them in wynter that thy beastes maye eate the brouse and the mosse of the bowes"
(OED). The reference to fodder may have become obsolete because more efficient

ways of providing winter feed have been devised. The first feature has survived,
though, through the conversion of the noun to a verb, meaning "to feed on the leaves
and shoots of shrubs, trees, etc., said of goats, deer and cattle" (OED). Today we
still speak of animals browsing, though it may be used most often with reference to
certain animals such as deer. Shakespeare used this meaning metaphorically in
Cymbelline: "There is cold meat i' th' cave, we'l brouz on that" (qtd. in OED).

Whether this kind of metaphor became a stock metaphor is uncertain, but it does
seem feasible. However, the metaphor to browse in a library has become not only a
stock metaphor but also a new sense of the verb browse; e.g., "We get a glimpse of
him browsing--for ... he was always a random reader--in his father's library" (qtd. in
OED). It is not uncommon today to hear browse refer to the casual sampling of

books in a library, and in the U.S. we also speak of browsing in a department store,
at a magazine rack, a garage sale, a crafts fair, a bake sale, etc. This sense would
not have been established if the original noun had not been converted to a verb.
Using lock as an example, Figure (6) also illustrates how a new sense can be
used metaphorically, but in this case the subsequent new sense seems to be what is
commonly known as an idiom. Again, conversion from a noun to a verb was a
necessary phase. As a noun, lock originally referred to
an appliance for fastening a door, lid, etc. , consisting of a bolt (or
system of bolts) with mechanism by which it can be propelled and
withdrawn by means of a key or similar instrument. (In OE app. used
with wider meaning, applied, e.g. to a bar, bolt, latch, or the like.)
(OED)
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Example: browse

( n. ) young shoots & twigs
of shrubs, trees, etc.

F-0.l:

--

FEATURE: use of browse

?

subsequent use
F.1: eaten by goats, deer,
cattle, etc. in the
field or in the wild

w
F .1. a: gathered as f odde r
for cattle, etc.

CONVERSION (N - - > V)

'I

~

F-0.l.a: to feed on the leaves
& shoots of shrubs,
trees, etc., said of
goats, cattle, deer

~

NOVEL METAPHOR:
to read parts of books
as if similar to animals
browsing ( i. e. , casually
/
sampling)

.....

,

obsolete ?

-NOVEL METAPHOR:
to nibble food as if similar
to animals browsing (e.g.,
Shakespeare: There is cold

1 /

meat i' th' cave, we'l brouz
on that.)

-'

....

~

"'

STOCK METAPHOR

~TOCK

'I
I F-0.2 11

METAPHOR

?

<"'

new sense
~

,

NOVEL METAPHOR:
to look casually over
'I articles for sale.

--

~STOCK
~

F-0.3

~

'

~_,,

METAPHORS

new sense

~

to examine anything casually

Figure 5. A new sense established by metaphoric extension used
metaphorically, leading to another new sense.
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The verb lock, then, means to fasten a door, etc. with a lock. One metaphor, to lock

horns, has extended this meaning into the domain of animals; specifically male
animals with horns, such as cattle, sheep, elk, and deer. The metaphor, of course, is
saying that when the horns of these animals become stuck together during battle, the
situation may be seen as if it were similar to the closure of a mechanical lock. Today
the expression is at least a stock metaphor, and probably a new sense of lock.
One reason it can be considered a new sense is that the whole phrase, to lock

horns, has been used metaphorically to compare human combat, whether physical or
intellectual, to that of these animals; it does not compare human conflict to a
mechanical lock. In other words, with reference to these animals, to lock horns
expresses a first-order meaning, and when the phrase is used metaphorically with
reference to humans, it also expresses a second-order meaning. However, in normal
conversation, there is some degree to which we disregard the reference to animals in
combat, and therefore it is at least a stock metaphor. If a new sense has been
established, it is probably an idiomatic sense.
On the other hand, it may be that, once a novel metaphor acquires currency in
everyday speech as a stock metaphor, its conventional sense can be extended without
necessarily first becoming established as a new, literal and conventional sense. For
example, if we can lock in on a military target by using radar, then we can also

lock in on someone's ideas, an argument, a job, a contract, a business deal, etc., as if
similar to using radar. There are many other examples of this extension. If the
meaning of user-friendly becomes commonly understood, then it can be extended to
include customer-friendly, viewer-friendly, family-friendly, etc. Once we appreciate
the function of a computer-program menu, then we know what is meant by investment

menu. In effect, this extension broadens the metaphorical meaning.
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lock

Example:

F-0.1:

d,

(n.) a mechanical device
for fastening a door,
gate, box, drawer, etc.

CONVERSION

F-0.1.a:

-.....

(N · - - > V)

(v.) to fasten a door,
etc. with a lock
~

NOVEL METAPHOR:
to lock horns
(re. cattle, rams,
~( elk, deer, etc.)

NOVEL METAPHOR:
to lock eyes

....

~)
.....

~

.......

STOCK METAPHOR

STOCK METAPHOR

\I/

OTHER
STOCK
METAPHORS

\II

F-0. 2

1
' '

...._

..._

.-----·=:)
I

I
\I

\II

I

new sense

~

OTHER
NOVEL
METAPHORS

l~l

NOVEL METAPHOR:
to lock horns
(re. human conflict)

~-=:)

new sense
::::..

"7'

\If

NEW
SENSES

...._

_..

STOCK METAPHOR
(idiom)

F-0.2.b

new idiomatic sense

'V'

etc.

Figure 6. A possible pattern for the broadening of meaning in
metaphoric extension.
Figure (6) suggests as well that metaphorical meaning is also broadened when
it is used in many different contexts. As with to lock eyes, many expressions seem to
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convey the sense of fastening or securing something as if similar to the action of a
lock:
to lock arms, fingers, etc.
locked away in one's head, heart, etc.
to have a lock on something
to be locked into something
to lock up a contract, a business deal, etc.
headlock/armlock/necklock (wrestling terms)

deadlock
locked in an embrace
lockstep
There are at least three idioms involving lock: to lock horns (referring to humans),

under lock and key and lock, stock and barrel. Some obsolete uses of lock include
reference to a hobble for horses, an enclosure for goats, and a lift on a railway. Of
course, a lock on a river or canal is still a passagway for boats. Other uses include:

oarlock or rowlock
vaporlock, airlock
land-locked
flintlock, wheel-lock, percussion-lock, and matchlock
lock-nut, lock-piece, lock-band, lock-chain, etc.
Joints (ankles, knees, jaws, etc.) as well as brakes and gears can lock or lock up, and

lock can be used to refer to anything that fastens one thing to another or stops parts of
a mechanism from moving. Indeed, many things, both abstract and concrete, can be

locked or interlocked.

However, with such a broad meaning, how do we know

which of these examples of lock express senses derived from its metaphoric use, and
which derive from its literal use? Many other patterns of metaphoric extension can
probably be identified, but the various uses of lock suggest that we need to be
cautious in identifying such patterns and attributing semantic change to that process.
The key is to have some understanding of how semantic change resulting from
metaphoric extension relates to other processes of semantic change.
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METAPHORIC EXTENSION AND SEMANTIC CHANGE
Philologists in the 19th Century described three basic processes of semantic
change which are still generally accepted: generalization (or extension), specialization
(or restriction), and shift (or transfer).
A sense may expand to include more referents than it formerly had
(generalization), contract to include fewer referents (specialization), or
shift to include quite a different set of referents (transfer of meaning)
... When we increase the scope of a word, we reduce the number of
features in its definition that restrict its application. For instance...
a mill was earlier a place for making things by the process of grinding
... A mill is now simply a place for making things; the grinding has
been eliminated ... The opposite of generalization is specialization, a
process in which, by adding to the features of meaning, the referential
scope of a word is reduced. Deer, for instance, used to mean simply
'animal'. (Pyles and Algeo 1982, pp. 242-244)
Meaning may be transferred in many ways. For example, the meanings of long and

shon have been transferred from spatial to temporal concepts. Meaning may also be
transferred from concrete to abstract, from subjective to objective and vice versa, and
from one sensory faculty to another. Metonymy involves the transfer of meaning
from one thing to something it suggests or is closely related to, as when hand is used
to refer to someone's writing. Metaphor is probably the most productive type of
semantic transfer, as "when we extend the word foot 'lowest extremity of an animal'
to all sorts of things" (Pyles and Algeo 1982, pp. 244-245). (See also Brea! 1897/
1964; Leech 1974; Lyons 1977; Miiller 1874; Stem 1931; and Waldron 1967.)
Sometimes it is difficult to attribute semantic change to any of these processes.
For example, rather has neither become narrower nor broader, nor has it transferred
meaning to 'all sorts of things'. Rather, it seems to have shifted from denoting
'precedence in time' to denoting (a) contrast or opposition, as it does in introducing
this sentence; (b) degree, as in I rather enjoy etymology; (c) preference, as in I would

rather do it myself, and (d) 'more truly, accurately, precisely, or properly speaking'.
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These related senses may have resulted from the kind of shift that Waldron (1967)
calls "a marginal change among the criteria of a lexical category" (p. 142). Other
examples include bargain (from 'agreement' to 'a good deal'), literally (from 'nonfiguratively' to 'actually'), and kick the bucket (from 'to be killed' to 'to die').
As presented here, this scheme oversimplifies the topic, but even in more
detailed analyses there are many questions lurking in the background. For example,
what is the difference between saying that generalized literal meaning 'includes more
referents' and saying that metaphoric transfer extends meaning 'to all sorts of things'?
Waldron (1967) points out that the terms generalization and specialization "describe
what happens in nearly all shifts" (p. 149). Therefore, perhaps any 'transfer' is not a
separate process of semantic change, but part of either generalization or
specialization, or both.
More pertinent to our purposes is the issue of distinguishing between
metaphoric extension and literal generalization. 5 When metaphoric extension results
in semantic change, is it the result of using an expression metaphorically in many
contexts, or is the fact that it can be used in many contexts an indication that the
meaning has already been broadened? Perhaps metaphor itself broadens the meaning
of the expression. For example, when we use a metaphor such as to lock eyes, we
are eliminating all the features of the meaning of the verb lock (referring to the
mechanical device) except the feature of fastening two things together; therefore, we
are expanding the scope of the word to include reference to eyes, arms, horns, etc.
The conclusion has to be that either metaphor generalizes literal meaning or it
broadens metaphorical meaning in a way that is very similar to the way generalization
broadens meaning. Perhaps literal generalization occurs in metaphoric extension after
a new sense is established. On the other hand, for example, perhaps the literal
meaning of lock (v.) had been generalized to mean 'to fasten or secure anything,
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whether concrete or abstract' long before it was ever used with reference to eyes,
arms, or horns. Would it not be the case, then, that once literal meaning is
generalized to that extent, an expression cannot be used metaphorically because there
is no context in which it would not have literal reference?
These issues cannot be resolved here, and yet we need to be fairly certain of
when semantic change results from metaphoric extension as opposed to literal
generalization. Tentatively we could utilize the concept of domains as a basic
criterion since metaphor involves the use of an expression to refer to something in a
distinctly different experiential, conceptual, or phenomenal domain. Perhaps this is
what is meant by the idea that metaphor extends meaning to 'all sorts of things'. In
contrast, generalization may involve the extension of literal meaning to many referents
in the same domain.
This distinction can be seen in another example of generalization given by
Pyles and Algeo (1982):
For instance, tail (from OE ta!gl) in earlier times seems to have meant
'hairy caudel appendage, as of a horse.' When we eliminated the
hairiness (or the horsiness) from the meaning, we increased its scope,
so that in Modem English the word means simply 'caudal appendage.'
(p. 243)
There is a _!Il~taphorical meaning that has also been broadened, and consequently we
use tail to refer to the end of almost anything non-animal; for example, tail of a tale/a
story/a shirt/a comet/a plane/an eddy of water; tail-wind,· tail-off; tailings; etc.
Apparently the broad meaning established by metaphoric extension can make
reference in almost any domain as long as it is not. an animal-with-a-tail domain.
Conversely, in order for the literal meaning to be generalized, the domain must be
broad enough to include all animals with tails.
However, it may be necessary to include the stipulation that generalization
extends meaning into closely related domains as well. This is suggested by a more
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detailed analysis of the literal generaliz.ation of mill, Figure (7), which reveals that it
is not quite accurate to say mill now refers to any 'place for making things'. A

machine shop is not called a mill; nor do we use mill to refer to a place in which
metal is stamped or pressed, plastic is extruded, electronic components are assembled,
etc. The broad domain in which mill has been generalized could be identified as
MANUFACTURING, but mill more specifically refers to certain kinds of machinery
doingO certain kinds of work in certain kinds of buildings.
Originally mill referred to both the machinery used for grinding grain (or

corn, as it was called) and the building fitted with such machinery. (The OED points
out that, even though mill apparently was used to refer separately to machinery in the
16th C., earlier usage did not distinguish between the machinery and the building
"which was necessarily connected with it.") The first general feature of this
definition, the machinery (F.l), is characterized by three other features: (F.l.a) a
revolving wheel or cylinder; (F.1.b) the action of reducing grain to powder or pulp
by grinding or crushing; and (F.l.c) powered by either wind or water. Since the
work of the wheel or cylinder is to grind and crush, then any wheel that grinds,
crushes, or cuts solid material in a similar fashion could be called a mill; e.g., a drillbit used in mining ore, a (metal) milling machine, and a wood-saw. This feature was
further generalized to include any machine doing work by rotary motion; e.g., rolling
(metal), spinning (fibers), fulling (cloth), coin fluting, etc. The second feature of the
machinery (F .1. b) has been generalized from specifically grinding grain into flour to
grinding or crushing any solid substance such as wood-chips and chocolate. It is also
used to refer to the reduction of ore into fragments, hulling seeds, and expressing
juice in a cider-mill or a cane-mill. With the broader meaning of milling machinery
as well as concommitant technological changes, the feature (F. l.c) of being powered
by wind or water is no longer a relevent distinction. The second general feature, the
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Example: mill
(n). A mechanical apparatus for grinding grain
& the building fitted with this machinery

I

~

II F .1: machinery for grinding grain II

[J

F .1.., revel ving wheel

or cylinder

r

I
..___

mining: drillbit
metal-cutting
wood-sawing

r-- flatting

\I/

any machine
doing work by
rotary motion

~

(glass, metal)
fulling (cloth)
rolling (metal)
spinning
tanning
printing
coin fluting
stamping (gold, silver)

[___

--I--!

L-j

F.l.b: reduces grain
to powder /pulp ~
by grinding or
crushing

F. 1. c : powered by
wind or water

F.2:
'--'1

....._

.....

building fitted with
machinery for grinding
grain into flour;
i.e., a flour-mill

any solid substance (wood-chips,
chocolate, tobacco)
mining: crush or grind into
fragments
seed-hulling (partial grinding)
expressing juice (cider-mill,
cane-mill)
any machine doing the work
of a mill, whether or not
powered by wind or water

---

woolen-mill
steel-mill
rubber-mill
saw-mill
\It
rolling-mill
building fitted with
paper-mill
fulling-mill
machinery doing any ~
flatting-mill
kind of milling
....._
11---

Figure 7. Mill: an example of literal generalization.
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building (F.2), now refers to any building fitted with machinery for doing any kind of
milling; e.g., woolen-mill, saw-mill, paper-mill, rubber-mill, etc.
Even though it is difficult to define precisely the domain to which mill
belongs, it seems to be characterized by manufacturing processes utilizing machines
that do their work by rotary motion. Some mills turn material in order to process it,
and others grind, crush, or cut solid material through the use of cylinders or wheels.
Therefore, we could either use a detailed description to identify a broad domain, or
we could identify several narrower, closely-related domains such as flour-milling,
mining, cloth manfacturing, and lumber-production. In either case, when mill is used
to make reference in those domains, the sense expressed is the result of literal
generalization.
Apparently mill has not been used metaphorically very often, but one metaphor
provides a reason to choose narrower, closely-related domains over a broad domain:

to mill about (or around). This expression describes people or animals moving
around in a cluster, as if similar to the slow turning of (specifically) a flour-mill.
Incidentally, if we consider the degree to which we disregard the reference to a flourmill, we would probably conclude that it is either a stock metaphor or a dead
metaphor and, therefore, a new sense of mill.
It is fairly obvious that to mill about is metaphorical because it makes

reference in two distinctly different domains, animals and humans. But the criterion
of domains can also help determine whether the meaning of an expression that sounds
metaphorical actual derives from metaphoric usage or not. For example, to overhaul

an engine sounds metaphorical because haul means to pull or draw something, but it
is actually a product of literal generalization. Overhaul has a nautical origin: "To
slacken (a rope) by pulling in the opposite direction to that in which it is drawn in
hoisting; to release and separate the blocks of (a tackle) in this way" (OED). This
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meaning was generalized as follows: [slacken a rope, etc.]

> [pull any piece

of nautical machinery apart in order to examine in detail and make repairs]
[pull any machinery apart, etc., nautical or not]

>

> [take apart and repair

engines, cars, boats, milling machines, punch presses, etc.]. Either the generalization
broadened the domain of overhaul from (perhaps) NAUTICAL MACHINERY to
MACHINERY, or it allowed overhaul to be used in many closely-related domains.
When overhaul is used in a completely different domain, such as EDUCATION, then
it is metaphorical; e.g., to overhaul the educational system. In fact, the metaphoric
use of overhaul has established a new sense, which has been broadened to make
reference in many non-machinery domains. Consequently it is possible to overhaul a
policy manual, a set of beliefs, a wardrobe, etc.
In the same way, the criterion of domains should help identify the
metaphorically-derived senses of lock. Since lock was originally a mechanical device,
literal generalization occurs in any domain involving mechanical devices; e.g.,

oarlock; airlock; flintlock; lock-nut; locked brakes; and a lock on a river. In contrast,
semantic change resulting from metaphoric extension makes reference to humans,
animals, abstract concepts, or anything in a non-mechanical domain; e.g., to lock

eyes, arms, etc.; to lock in on something; headlock; locked knees; etc.
In opposition to this claim, it might be argued that expressions such as locked

brakes and a lock on a river could be metaphorical because they suggest similarity to
the locking device. However, both a river lock and the locking of brakes may be
seen as literally similar to the mechanical lock, whereas the comparison in to lock

eyes is metaphorically similar, but not similar in fact. Furthermore, it seems feasible
to trace the generalization from the mechanical lock to locked brakes as follows:
[mechanism that locks]
fixed, fast, or rigid]

>

[a device for keeping any set of movable parts

> [an action or condition that causes movable parts to
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become fixed, etc.; e.g., to cause brakes to lock]. The reference to a river lock was
probably generalized as follows: [mechanism that locks]
by a lock]

> [a place secured

> [a barrier or enclosure; e.g., for goats (now obsolete); a jail]

- - - > [a barrier on a river (now obsolete)]

> [a system of gates and

sluices on a river or canal to lift or lower boats from one level to another]. (See

OED.)
By utilizing the concept of domains as a criterion, we are merely extending
one of the basic criteria for identifying a metaphor. However, this approach still does
not resolve two problems. First, it is impossible to know with certainty whether an
expression such as to lock eyes was ever used metaphorically, or whether it expresses
a literal generalization, meaning 'to fasten anything, whether concrete or abstract'.
Second, in and of itself, the criterion of domains does not always stipulate the
domains involved. For example, if to overhaul the educational system is
metaphorical, is it derived from the nautical usage of overhaul or from the reference
to overhauling an automobile engine? Similarly, is swamped with work derived from
the reference to a swamp or the reference to the sinking of a boat?
Questions such as these may only be answered by considering pragmatic
factors. One speaker may have knowledge of 'to cause a boat to sink' as a sense of

swamp (v.), while another may only think of the conditions in a swamp and,
therefore, interpret swamped with work to mean 'as if stuck in a swamp with no way
out'. If to overhaul the educational system is construed as a metaphor, recent cultural
experience would probably compel the interpretation that it makes a comparison to
overhauling an automobile engine, rather than overhauling a block and tackle. As for

to lock eyes, the historical fact of whether or not it was ever used as a metaphor is
irrelevant. All that matters is that it can be intended or construed as a metaphor and,
therefore, at one time it probably was a novel metaphor. Even if the meaning of lock
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had been generalized to refer to anything abstract or concrete, this use of lock refers
to something in a distinctly different domain than that of the mechanical lock;
therefore, it is at least a stock metaphor, and probably a dead metaphor.
A re-examination of clue can summarize how metaphoric extension relates to
other processes of semantic change. By the 9th C., it had the broad meaning of 'a
ball or conglomeration, usually formed by rolling or coiling something'. That sense
became obsolete as it was replaced by more specialized senses, two of which are still
in use today. First, as a verb, it means ' to roll up the lower ends of sails'; hence,
'the lower ends of sails'; hence, 'a metal loop fastened to those ends'. The second
sense also has a nautical origin, referring to the cluster of lines on which a hammock
is hung. (See OED and Webster's.) The specialized sense of 'ball of yarn or thread'
became obsolete, replaced by its metaphoric use, which has since become established
as a new literal sense. This sense has become broadened in two directions. First, it
includes many referents: an idea, an object, a fact, a theory, etc. Second, it
expresses a broad sense, which can be represented by terms that would be
synonymous in certain contexts: hint, suggestion, answer, solution, indication,
symptom, guess, etc.
Generalization and specialization are systematic processes of semantic change,
and whether metaphoric extension should be regarded as a transfer of meaning or a
mode of generalization, it does seem to be systematically related to these processes.
However, in order to avoid erroneously attributing all sorts of senses to presumed
metaphors, it is important to distinguish between literal generalization and the
broadening of meaning produced by metaphoric extension. The concept of domains
seems to be a useful criterion for making this distinction.
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CONCLUSIONS
Metaphoric extension can result in semantic change, but it does not necessarily
follow that "today's metaphor is tomorrow's literal sense" (Moore 1982, p. 23). Not
every novel metaphor is retained for its communicative value in everyday speech.
Among those that are retained, not all become established as dead metaphors
expressing a literal and conventional sense. Many should be regarded as stock
metaphors (or by some similar designation) because they express some degree of
conventional sense and yet may easily be intended or construed as metaphors.
However, even though stock metaphors may not have undergone permanent semantic
change, both stock metaphors and dead metaphors are components of our lexical
inventory and, therefore, eligible to be taught as vocabulary items.
In identifying dead metaphors and stock metaphors as vocabulary items, it is
important to keep in mind that we would be teaching senses of words. They are
senses that have survived the prior metaphoric use of words. Furthermore, these
senses often depend upon collocation with other words, and therefore whole
expressions as well as sets of related words and senses need to be taught as well.
Since these expressions have the potential to exhibit the peculiar characteristics of
metaphor--that is, the multi-faceted duality of sense--we also need to teach the process
of metaphoric extension. In other words, we need to be able to explain not only why
these expressions are regarded by native speakers as some kind of metaphor, but also
how they changed from novel metaphors to the lexical items that they are.
I have suggested one possible dynamic for this process: speakers and hearers
tacitly agree to disregard the original literal meaning (or first-order meaning) in order
to achieve communicative goals with the meaning established by the metaphor (or the
second-order meaning). This is not a haphazard, accidental occurrence, but a
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systematic process of metaphoric extension that is driven by pragmatic factors. We
intentionally use a word or phrase to express a metaphorical comparison. If that
metaphorical meaning continues to express intended meaning, we intentionally use it
as a conventional sense (i.e., as a stock metaphor); in some cases, we use it as a
literal and conventional sense (i.e., as a dead metaphor). This process can be
represented by diagrams which trace the various patterns that metaphoric extension
can follow.
Since we are dealing with a process that sometimes results in permanent
semantic change, we also need to be able to relate metaphoric extension to other
processes of semantic change. The most important process is probably literal
generalization because metaphoric extension also broadens meaning. Although we
may never be absolutely certain whether a sense has derived from metaphoric
extension or literal generalization, we need to be fairly clear about the distinction
between the two. If the concept of domains is taught as one of the criteria for
identifying a metaphor, then it should also be useful in explaining this distinction to
the students.
In selecting and organizing a vocabulary based on metaphoric extension, we
need to begin with a clear idea of what a metaphor is; that is, what the criteria are for
identifying a metaphor. Then we need to ask three basic questions about the
candidate expressions: (1) Is it possible for a speaker to intend and/or a hearer to
construe the expression as a metaphor? If the answer to this question is 'yes', then it
must have the potential to express both first-order and second-order meaning.
Therefore, (2) what are those meanings, and how is the second-order meaning a
function of the first-order meaning? We are not looking for novel metaphors, but
expressions that probably have been used as novel metaphors and are now normally
used without intending them as metaphors. Therefore, (3) in normal conversation, is
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there any degree to which the speaker and the hearer disregard the first-order meaning
in favor of the second-order meaning? In answering these and related questions, we
are talcing the intuition that native speakers have about these expressions and putting it
into objective terms for the ESL student. The bottom line is, it is not sufficient
merely to label these expressions as 'dead metaphors'.
A Metaphor for Metaphoric Extension
Kittay (1987) draws an analogy between metaphoric use of language and
archaeology.
Language, similarly, has an archaeological, layered quality ... there is
language that we now understand as literal but whose origins are
metaphorical, whose meaning still carries some of the import of its
metaphorical beginnings. The originating metaphorical sense has not
been destroyed. Instead it subsists in the new sense just as the ruins of
former cities persist in the foundations of the new city. (p. 21)
However, the patterns of metaphoric extension suggest an alternative metaphor: the

bushes and branching metaphor used by S. J. Gould (1987b; 1988) to represent his
view of evolution.
Evolution, at least at geological scales, is fundamentally about bushes
and branching. Modern Homo sapiens and the extinct Neanderthals are
two distinct branches, two contemporaneous species for most of their
existence ... Evolutionary trends ... arise within a forest of distinct
branches. Most of these branches die; a few are successful and
produce more branches like themselves to fuel the transition.
Neanderthals became extinct; Homo sapiens survived. (1988, p. 21)
An expression may be used metaphorically, and if it continues to express intended
meaning, the metaphorical sense becomes established as either a conventional sense or
a new literal and conventional sense; a new 'branch' has grown. If it is a new literal
and conventional sense, it can be used metaphorically, which in turn can branch out
to another new sense, and so on. Of course, not every metaphoric use becomes
established in the lexicon, and some new senses also 'die out'. In some cases, such
as aftermath and harrowing, the main trunk--the original literal meaning--dies out
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except where the metaphoric senses have branched out. But often the main trunk
survives and grows more branches; that is, the literal meaning may become
generalized and therefore used in more contexts, which may give rise to new
metaphors. The bushes and branching metaphor is not exactly parallel to the process
of metaphoric extension in all respects, but at least it may remind us that the senses
established by that process are not dead and buried.
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NOTES
1

We cannot say with absolute certainty that any sense has become obsolete.

There is always the possibility that someone, speaking some dialect of English, uses

clue to refer to a ball of yarn or thread.
2

This idea seems to be supported by current pragmatic theory regarding

'processing effort'. For example, Sperber and Wilson (1988) state that "processing
effort is a negative factor: other things being equal, the greater the processing effort,
the lower the relevance" (p. 124).
3

A more accurate term would be prior because we can never know with

certainty the first meaning of any word. However, I am using original in this sense:
"That from which anything arises, springs, or is derived; source" (OED).
4

The aspects of meaning I am calling features could be identified as

connotations, implications, or semantic features; others might be categorized
according to Nunberg's (1978) referring functions, such as 'type of', 'source of',
'location of', 'part of', etc. My use of features follows Pyles and Algeo (1982), and
my intention is to avoid lengthy justifications of alternative terms.
5

The distinction between metaphoric extension and specialization seems to be

clearer. Perhaps this is because metaphor involves the reduction of features. For
example, if there is any kind of semantic 'transfer' in the man is a wolf, it involves
only one small aspect of wolf, namely, certain wolf behavior, and only wolf behavior
in an abstract sense. Therefore, the scope of the meaning of wolf is broadened to
include reference to man. I cannot think of a metaphor that narrows the meaning of
the word used metaphorically.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING

Chapter I argued that there is a need to teach some vocabulary directly and
reviewed some of the recent research striving to identify central patterns of word
usage. It also introduced the idea that one of those central patterns is metaphoric
extension and proposed that, therefore, the so-called 'dead' metaphors produced by
that process are candidates for direct teaching. Chapter II attempted to develop a
clearer understanding of what metaphor is in order to help the teacher explain
metaphor to ESL students in more precise terms than those in which standard
definitions are stated. This explanation of metaphor can also serve as the basis for
describing the process of metaphoric extension in a way that facilitates the selection,
organization, and teaching of a vocabulary based on that process, which was the
objective of Chapter III. In describing metaphoric extension, it was necessary to
develop a plausible explanation of how a novel metaphor becomes established in the
lexicon as that expression known as a dead metaphor.
If the ideas presented herein are found to have some merit, the next step is to

select and organize the vocabulary. However, that involves projects that lie beyond
the scope of this paper. In preparation for that work, this paper concludes with two
brief guidelines for the teacher: (1) suggestions on explaining metaphor in the
classroom; (2) ideas on selecting and organizing vocabulary items.
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EXPLAINING METAPHOR IN THE CLASSROOM

Fortunately, the definitions of metaphor available to ESL students are
sufficiently vague to allow for a supplementary, more precise explanation. 1 This can
be accomplished by discussing metaphor in terms of the main features identified in
Chapter II: comparison; substitution; an 'as-ir quality; two referents in different
domains; first-order/second-order meaning; and encompassing all of these, a duality
of sense. In order to augment standard definitions, the following points need to be
emphasized.
The first point is that, indeed, a metaphor does make an implicit comparison
of two unlike things, but it does not imply that these two things are in fact similar.
The comparison that a metaphor makes expresses the idea that two substantially
different things may be seen as

if they were similar.

A typical example the students

are probably familiar with is My love is a rose, and here it should be clear that a
person and a flower can only be similar in some metaphorical way.
Second, although a metaphor does seem to imply a comparison rather than
state it directly, the standard method of contrasting a metaphor with a simile is an
inadequate explanation. Most definitions of metaphor claim the only difference
between the two is that a simile uses a term such as like or as, while a metaphor does
not. However, the mere omission of like or as does not necessarily make a simile
into a metaphor, and vice versa. I can compare a dahlia to a rose by saying The

dahlia is like a rose, but if I say The dahlia is a rose, I have not created a metaphor;
I have only uttered an absurdity. In contrast, I can compare my wife to a rose with
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My love is like a rose, and the comparison is still a metaphor because a woman is not
like a rose in any way except metaphorically. The comparison in a simile may be
either literal or metaphorical. A literal simile can express how two things are in fact
similar, but a metaphor can never do so.
Furthermore, the comparison in a metaphor can be relatively explicit, as in

Patterson was a gamecock, moderate in height, wiry in build, jittery in movement and
irascible in expression. This metaphor demonstrates that no matter how a metaphor is
elaborated upon, it still expresses a metaphorical comparison. Therefore, it is more
important to focus on how metaphor makes a metaphorical comparison than on formal
aspects.
One formal aspect that is sometimes included in definitions of metaphor is the
idea that metaphor makes a substitution. The Patterson metaphor suggests that this is
not always the case. The term used metaphorically, a gamecock, is not put in place
of anything else; rather, it is combined with all the adjective phrases in the subject
complement. On the other hand, the entire subject complement could be regarded as
a figurative phrase that is used instead of some other literal phrase describing
Patterson. Therefore, if the teacher is trying to augment a definition that regards
metaphor as a substitution, it would be safe to say that, in general, metaphor
substitutes a figurative phrase for a literal phrase.
As might be inferred from the conclusions in Chapter II, focusing on the
pragmatic aspects of metaphor could help explain what is meant by 'figurative phrase'
and 'metaphorical comparison'. It needs to be stressed that metaphor is a particular
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use of language that depends upon not only contextual factors, speaker/hearer
background, etc., but also a tacit agreement between speaker and hearer to accept the
'as-if conditions. That is, the speaker is asking the hearer to see two substantially
different things as if they were similar, all the while knowing that they are not in fact
similar. Without this agreement, the utterance could be interpreted as a lie, a mistake
expressing mere ambiguity, an absurdity, etc. Therefore, whether or not the intended
metaphorical comparison is communicated depends crucially on the mutual acceptance
of the 'as-if conditions.
This is the basis of the duality of sense in metaphor, for it is only within the
'as-if conditions that a word or phrase can refer meaningfully to two substantially
different things. In effect, the expression used metaphorically is temporarily given an
additional referent as well as an additional sense. One concrete way of explaining
this is to use the concept of domains, which could be presented as a domain of use, a
domain of reference, a conceptual field, a semantic field, or some other broad
concept. Regardless of the terms used, the concept can serve as a litmus test for
identifying a metaphor. For example, The dahlia is a rose cannot be a metaphor
because both terms belong to the domain of (perhaps) FLOWERS; they are, in fact,
quite similar. In contrast, rose and its referent belong to FLOWERS, while my love
and its referent belong to the HUMAN domain.
One way to explain the additional sense is to regard it as 'second-order
meaning', which is a function of the first-order meaning. There is a duality of sense
in a metaphor not only because there are two different referents, but also because the
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speaker and the hearer attend equally to both the first-order meaning and the secondorder meaning. Explaining the duality of sense in terms of first-order/second-order
meaning may be more effective than standing at a chalkboard and drawing an arc
from the 'vehicle' to the 'tenor' in an effort to illustrate the vague idea that meaning
is 'carried over'.
In doing so, the teacher will probably have to contend with the terms tenor (or

topic), vehicle, ground and tension because they are used in most standard
explications of metaphor. The tenor is simply what the metaphor is about--the subject
or topic of the metaphor; e.g., my love. The vehicle is the word or phrase used
metaphorically; e.g., rose. The vehicle is so-called because it 'carries' the
metaphorical meaning; the term reflects the traditional idea that there is a 'transfer' of
meaning. With a little re-interpretation, ground can be understood as referring to the
'as-ir similarity which the speaker and hearer agree to see, and tension can be
understood as referring to their awareness that the two terms of the metaphor are not
actually similar. However, it is not necessary to use these labels if metaphor is
explained in terms of first-order/second-order meaning, two referents in two distinct
domains, and the necessity of a pragmatic agreement to see one thing as if it were
similar to another.
Focusing on the pragmatic aspects of metaphor can also help ESL students
understand why an expression that could be recognized and construed as a metaphor
is used in everyday conversation apparently without the speakers intending to express
a metaphorical comparison. This is a problem for students of any foreign language.
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A simple explanation could be that an expression that at one time was intentionally
used to express a metaphorical comparison is now intentionally used by the majority
of speakers to express a relatively conventional or even literal sense. This
explanation could be reinforced with diagrams as well as the description of
metaphoric extension as a process in which speakers, for communicative purposes,
may disregard the first-order meaning in favor of the second-order meaning. If the
students understand the process, then it should be easier for them to comprehend, for
example, why so many things can be jump-started, such as a career, a job, a political
campaign, the Soviet economy; why so many things can be regarded as a shuttle or a
bottom line; why so many things can be mafnstream, fringe, held hostage, shuttled,
leveraged, or bailed out. In other words, understanding metaphoric extension as a

process can serve not only as an etymological framework for relating the
metaphorically-derived senses of an expression, but also as a guide in learning many
expressions that have (or are gaining) currency in contemporary English.
Consequently, understanding the process of metaphoric extension can serve as a
springboard for developing strategies for both teaching and learning vocabulary.

SELECTING AND ORGANIZING THE VOCABULARY

For teaching purposes, the main advantage of identifying a central pattern of
word usage is that it breaks down the total lexicon into smaller, more manageable
units. Consequently, it can help simplify an otherwise overwhelming task.
Therefore, two guidelines should be followed in developing a vocabulary based on

124
metaphoric extension. First, the scope of words to be selected must be controlled.
Second, both the sets of words and the sets of senses related to each word must be
organized in as simple a manner as possible.
The project would be far too broad and cumbersome if it included all words
with senses that have been metaphorically derived. It would be filled with scores of
words such as complicated, comprehend, spirit, skull, manage, and courage. To
narrow the list down, the first determining factor could be whether an original literal
meaning is still in use. Therefore, most of the vocabulary would consist of stock
metaphors. It would exclude genuinely dead metaphors such as clue, aftermath, and

complicated. On the other hand, some of these metaphors could be included in the
list of words associated with a selected vocabulary item. For example, if grasp is
selected, then comprehend should probably be listed along with take in and catch; and

courage may be included as associated with core. Also, sometimes it will be
necessary to explain an expression by recalling the metaphoric origin of an associated
word; for example, to thread one's way through the plot (of a story) is probably
derived from the metaphoric use of clue (OED).
The scope of the vocabulary may also be controlled by the goals of the course.
For example, an ESP course addressing the needs of students of manufacturing
management might require expressions such as tramp metal, memory (plastic), fatigue
(metal), and to cannibalize pans. In a notional-functional approach, a lesson focusing
on shopping may include browse, scour, dig, and cornered (by a salesperson). If
cross-cultural factors are stressed, then dead metaphors that reflect the U.S. culture
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could be selected and compared with those of other cultures. For example, in the
/

U.S. the value of individuality may be seen in the description of a relationship as

closely-knit; i.e., two individuals coming together. In contrast, Malays describe a
close relationship by "a phrase... [referring to] the pinan (a perfectly round fruit)
halved" (Deetz 1984, p. 224).
Approaches to teaching other vocabulary may also be used to limit the
selection of stock/dead metaphors. As pointed out in Chapter I, stock/dead metaphors
are represented in other central patterns of word usage, such as lexical phrases, core
words, and semantic fields. Incorporating stock/dead metaphors into these sets not
only helps selection decisions, but also provides a method of organization.
Despite its theoretical weaknesses, a semantic field approach can easily
accomodate stock/dead metaphors; for example:
architecture/construction

architecture, box in, bridge, build, bulldoze, ceiling, construct, construction, to
comer, deck, demolish, floor, foundation, framework, overarching, scaffolding, span,
stack up, stonewall, structure, threshhold, wall, window
body (human)

back, body, brow, butt, eye, face, finger, flesh out, foot, footing, foothold, hand,
head, heading, headland, headline, headquarters, head-on, heart, joint, leg, nose,
nosedive, rib, shoulder, teeth, tongue, toe
clothing and related materials

belt out, bonnet, bootstrap, clothe, clue, collar, fabric, fabricate, fringe, hood, skin,
strand, sew up, stitch (together), tear, thread, unravel, weave, yam
The advantage of this approach is that it provides a communicative purpose for the
organization.

i
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The advantage of this approach is that it provides a communicative purpose for the
organization.
With stock/dead metaphors, we also need to organize the the senses established
by metaphoric extension as well as other expressions that are related to those senses.
Furthermore, since the metaphorical sense of an expression is a function of a prior
literal and conventional sense, the metaphorically-derived senses need to be related to
the literal senses. For example, spark (n.) has two literal senses (or two features of a
single literal sense): (1) a small, glowing particle discharged from a fire, an electric
arc, a spark-plug, etc.; (2) the brief flash of light accompanying such a discharge.
The verb spark means (1) to cause such a discharge and consequently produce flashes
of light; and (2) to ignite a fire by discharging sparks. These senses have been
extended metaphorically: a spark of interest/life/ vitality/enthusiasm; to spark public
interest/a debate/a furor/an outcry/a battle. Furthermore, we can not only spark a
debate, but also kindle, ignite or touch off a debate; if there can be a spark of interest,
there can also be a particle or a trace of interest. Similarly, a related word, sparkle,
has also been extended metaphorically, as in sparkling personality, which can also be
described as glowing, glittering and brilliant.
The following examples suggest some ways in which related senses and related
expressions can be organized. In each case, there are four basic parts. First, the
literal sense is stated without going into too much detail. Second, the general sense
established by metaphoric extension is presented. Third, examples of the

I
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metaphorical sense are given (whether stock or dead), using as many parts of speech
as possible. Fourth, other expressions are related to the metaphorical sense.

skyrocket
Literal sense (n.): a fireworks rocket that explodes in mid-air.
Metaphorical sense (v.):
to rise suddenly, resulting in a sudden and significant impact, as if
similar to a skyrocket
Examples:
The Dow Jones average skyrocketed today.
The price of oranges has skyrocketed since the freeze.
Skyrocketing costs have forced an increase in tuition.
Related expressions:
Fuel prices are astronomical.
The price of oranges has soared.
Operating costs this month are sky-high.
Related idioms:

to go through the roof (referring to costs or prices)
to be out-ofthis-world (referring to costs or prices)
.flow
Literal sense (v.): to move as a liquid does, particularly a stream or river.
feature (1): to move smoothly, incessantly
feature (2): to pour forth suddenly, strongly
Literal sense (n.): the movement of liquid
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Metaphorical sense:
to move as if similar to the way liquid does, particularly as a river
moves, either (a) smoothly, gently, and easily, or (b) suddenly pouring
out.
By metaphoric extension, these things flow:
speech, writing style, music
thoughts, ideas, feelings
air, electricity, electrons, light, sound
groups: people, animals, insects
money, goods, products, traffic
Related words:
nouns: current, fluidity, outpouring, stream, trickle, influence,
confluence, effluence
verbs: pour out/forth, flood, inundate, stream out/forth, swamp,
trickle
adjectives: fluent, fluid, flowing, streaming, flooding, trickling
Examples:
He is respected for his fluid speech.
She is fluent in three languages.
There was an outpouring of sympathy for them.
I'm swamped with work.
The police department was flooded (or inundated) with calls.
The audience gave out a steady stream of hisses and boos.
The stream of people on the street slowed to a trickle.
electric current
the flow of electrons

foot (n. J
Literal sense: the end part of a leg, on which a person or animal stands or moves.
Core sense established by metaphoric use: lowest part of anything
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Examples:

foot
foot
foot
foot

of a
of a
of a
of a

mountain
bed/sofa
page/a column of figures
line (of people)

Idioms

to foot the bill: add up the figures on a meal ticket in preparation to
pay; hence, to pay the bill.
Idioms not associated with the metaphoric sense:

to hot-foot it (from or to someplace): to move quickly
to put one's best foot forward: to make a favorable appearance
to put one's foot in it (or in one's mouth): to commit an embarrassing
blunder.

to be undeifoot: to interfere
to have one foot in the grave: to be near death
bottom line
Literal meaning (n.):
the last line on a financial statement showing the net profit or loss of a
business.
Core sense established by metaphoric use:
That which is left after everything that can be added in is added in, and
everything that can be taken out is taken out.
Synonymous expressions:
net/net result
upshot
basic/fundamental issue
gist/ the gist of it
crux/ the crux of the matter

heart

II

truth "
main idea/issue/problem, etc
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most important point
most significant factor
conclusion
final result
last offer
the long-and-the-short-of-it
the nitty gritty
real issue
central issue
in the final analysis
last word
What this all boils down to ...
What I'm trying to say .. .
What I'm really saying .. .
Related uses of bottom:
bottom out
rock bottom
at bottom
bottom dollar
hit bottom
scraping the bottom of the barrel

Examples:
The bottom line is that they broke up.
The bottom line is diversity and sustainability of wild trout habitat.
Bottom line: do you think we should bring an NFL team here?
The bottom line of what I'm saying is that we shouldn't let it [the Iraq
conflict] get like Vietnam.
You need to know this when you enter a negotiation: what is your
bottom line, or what is the next best thing you will accept.
Somewhere we have failed--that's the bottom line.
He [Sadam Hussein] will not be allowed to stay in power [since he has
attacked Israel] ... that's the bottom line.
Blood's thicker than water--that's the bottom line.
These examples are only rough ideas, and more thorough analysis
accompanied by empirical research should be able to devise more appropriate formats.
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Any format will have to be flexible, open-ended, and supportive of other teaching
goals.
Prior to studying any such set of words, of course, the student must
understand that native speakers of English use these expressions as stock metaphors or
dead metaphors in normal conversation. That is, they are used to express either a
conventional or a literal and conventional sense even though the speakers may be
aware that at one time they were used as novel metaphors. Therefore, it is important
to teach not just the words and their senses, but also the process of metaphoric
extension.

----------------------------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,
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NOTES

1

Some typical examples are:

A metaphor acts like an equal sign: it implies a comparison by omitting
like or as. (Tucker and Costello 1985, p. 170)
A simile makes an explicit comparison between essentially unlike
things, introduced by a connective ... If the speaker omits "like," or
"as," or "than," making the literally impossible assertion "My heart is
a singing bird," he uses a metaphor" (Barnet, et. al. 1960, p. 42).
A figure of speech containing an implied comparison, in which a word
or phrase ordinarily and primarily used of one thing is applied to
another. (Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition
1984)
Metaphor, figure of speech that implies comparison between two unlike
entities, as distinguished from simile, an explicit comparison signalled
by the words "like" or "as." (Encyclopedia Britannica, 15th Edition
1988)
Metaphor: an implied comparison between two dissimilar things--an
analogy that imaginatively identifies one object with another and either
ascribes to the first qualities of the second or invests the first with
connotations inherent in the other. The metaphor is the fundamental
poetic figure of speech. (Encyclopedia Americana, International Edition
1989)
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